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PREFACE
I have long felt that to understand a scholar or a movement one
needs to first look at the background factors that gave him or it shape.
As I have become exposed to contemporary theology I have become increas
ingly aware of a dichotomized view of knowledge that has led the theolog
ical discussion to a stalemate. It is apparent to me that this dichot
omy in epistemology can be traced back to the works of Immanuel Kant.
Therefore, if theology is to move forward, the contradictions in his
epistemology must be overcome. This work attempts to re-examine Kant's
conclusions in the context of his historical situation, demonstrate the
inadequate directions which these conclusions have suggested, and pro
vide an alternative course for future theological discussions to take.
This work would not have com.e to fruition if not for the encourage
ment and the motivation of my ab.le and efficient professor, Dr. Laurence
W. Wood, who continues to gradually instruct me in philosophical issues.
I owe him a great deal of thanks and appreciation for his guidance
throughout this research. I am indebted to Mr. Bill W. Faupel and other
library staff who helped in seeing that I got all the m.aterials and re
sources I needed for the research. I am indebted to Mr. Faupel espe
cially for his patience in giving me clear explanation on the format of
this thesis and for making sure that it was correctly and orderly ar
ranged. What more can I say than to express my gratitude to the schol
arship committee who undertook the expenses of the thesis, without which
I would not have graduated. My thanks
the thesis and typed it. My gratitude
permitted me to write the thesis
V
to Mrs. Ina Guetschow, who edited
to the Seminary authority which
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Episterpology has become the central concern in philosophical in-
qxiiries, especially .since the v;ritings of Descartes. Philosophy, in
many instances since Kant, tends to be identified with epistemology
with ontological considerations being neglected. Certainly inquiry
into the functions and limits of knowledge is foundational for further
philosophical discussions. However, philosophy originally began with
ontological concerns, that is inquiries into the form and origin of the
universe, the nature of the soul and its relation to the body. It is
after this reflection on the nature of reality that the question of the
nature of knov/ledge and its possibility arose. Epistemology is a criti
cal reflection on the possibilities of knowing reality. Ontology and
epistemology are thus the two major areas of philosophical concerno This
had been the case with epistemology from ancient times until Descartes.
Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' methodological skepticism
and a hea^/y emphasis upon epistem.ological concerns. He believed that
^�^^ a priori method of reasoning established the basis for his metaphys
ical idealism. Descartes' m.ethod of reasoning is known as Continental
rationalism. Parallel to this is the British em.piricism which is brought
to focus in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It is out of
this British empiricism that a metaphysical knowledge could be obtained.
Hume carried Locke's empiricism to its logical conclusion that if real
ity is discerned exclusively through the senses, then the only realities
we know are limited to our senses (thus excluding metaphysical realities)
1
2It was this positivism of Hum.e that occasioned Kant's modification of
his idealistic philosophy into what he called a "critical philosophy."
Kant passed through the School of Wolffian metaphysics and through
an acquaintance with the popular German philosophers, he plunged into
Hume's profound statement of problems, and was enthusiastic for
Rousseau's gospel of Nature; the mathematical rigour of the Newton
ian natural philosophy, the fineness of the psychological analysis
of the origin of human ideas and volitions found in English litera
ture. Deism from Toland and Shaftesbury to Voltaire, the honour
able spirit of freedom v;ith which the French Enlightenment urged
the improvement of political and social conditions, all these had
found in the young Kant a true co-worker, full of conviction, who
with a rich .knowledge of the world and admirable sagacity, and also
where it was in place, with taste and v/it, though far from all self-
complacency and boasting, united typically within himself the best
features of the Enlightenment.
But it was in connection with the difficulties of the problem of
knowledge that Kant worked out from all these foundational elements the
result which gave him his peculiar significance. Epistemological in
quiries culminated in two questions: "What is the essence, and what is
2
the origin of knowledge?" Each of these questions gave rise to oppos
ing views, namely British empiricism and continental rationalism..
Concerning the question of the essence of knowledge, Lockean empir
icism answers that knowledge is a copy of reality, though its origin
is located in a sense experience. This idea is thus a representation of
the object. Cartesian rationalism, on the other hand, asserts that
ideas of reality are innate, whereas the empirical world are pale re
flections of reality itself. Rationalism asserts that all real knowl-
W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. James H. Tufts (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1901), p. 5'-2.
2
Friedrich Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Frank Thilly,
New York: Henry Holt arid Company, 1912), p. 340.
3edge is derived from reason. It is the result of the immanent evolution
of consequences from a priori certain principles which do not arise from
experience.
The answers by the theories of epistemology have led to four pos
sible fundamental forms. They are firstly, realistic empiricism., which
asserts that we know things as they are in themselves by perception;
secondly, realistic rationalsim, which asserts that we know things as
they are, not by the senses, but by reason. This view is held by Plato,
Spinoza, and Hegel, who claim that an adequate knov/ledge of reality can
be reached by reason. The third is idealistic empiricism which asserts
that we know things only by perception. This is the view of the critics
of epistemology of rationalistic-m.etaphysical systems, with Hume as its
most consistent representative. Lastly there is
'
idealistic rationalism
V7hich asserts that we can know reality a priori by pure reason; however,
not as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us, and only as to
its form.. This is tlie view held by kant. Thus, Kant came up with the
idea of the thing-in-itself , and the idea of appearance and reality
which he dichotomizes, hence leading to dualism in his epistemology.
Statement of Problem
This epistem':^logical dualism of Immanuel Kant has had a great im
pact on contemporary' religxous views. It, had an unusually great influ
ence on Schleierir.acher , the father of modern theology and classical lib
eralism. Kant established a dichotomy betv;een the noumena and the phe
nomena, the intelligible and the sensible, fact and value, the super
natural and the natural, the non-perceptible and the perceptible, and
4others of such dichotomy. This dichotomy has been handed down by schol
ars since his tiroeo It has thus always led to a tendency of many schol
ars to accentuate one side of the dichotomy at the expense of the other.
Contemporary theology has suffered a great deal from this dualism, and
it has even led many theological movem.ents away from the essence of
Christian truth, since this dichotomy precludes the possibility of a
supernatural revelation � It has thus led to a contemporary stalemate,
3
the outcome of which is intellectual schizophrenia, both culturally
and individually between whether fact and value has prior significance,
giving rise to such movements as positivism and existentialism.
My thesis, therefore, is that a critical study of this epistemolog
ical dualism (v/hich has brought about this dilemma and has caused such a
great deadlock in theology and philosophy alike) is necessary in order
to understand the central issue in contemporary philosophy of religion.
An attempt shall be made to make som.e suggestions which may be helpful
in resolving this dilemma.
Review of Literature
Professor Jerry Gill, in his book. The Possibility of Religious
Knowledge, clearly points out the devastating effects which Kant's epis
temological dualism, has had on religious knowledge. He further proceeds
to give some helpful suggestions or alternatives which can be used to
overcome this dualism, basing his arguments on che concept of language
being multi-dimensional and multi-functional as proposed by the later
Wittgenstein. Drawing heavily from Michael Polanyi's concept of per-
�^Jerry H. Gill, The _Possibilitv of Religious Kncwj.edge (Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdm--ins Publishi.^.g Comcany, 1971) , p. 14.
5sonal knowledge, he also arrives at the conclusion that tacit knowledge
"has been offered as a replacement for the dichotomized epistemology
underlying contemporary thought." This has obvious relevance for Chris
tian theology, and in ove.rcoming the epistemological dualism under con
sideration.
Michael Polanyi, the modern pioneer in epistemology, in his book.
Personal Knowledge, has come out with helpful insights which can be used
to overcome Kant's epistemological dualism. He has suggested the con
cept of heuristic epistemology; that knowledge is based on discovery.
He also suggested that there must be a continuum in knowledge rather
than a dichotomy which Kant proposed.
John Hick, in his. Faith and Knowledge, has also come up with an
other means of overcoming Kant's dualism with his concept of mediation
in knowledge, which is common to all cognitive experience. There is
interpenetration of one dimension to the other instead of the separated
entities ,
Division of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals
with the family, education, religious, and societal background of Imman
uel Kant.
The second chapter deals with Kant's attempt to synthesize rational
ism, and empiricism, analytic a priori and synthetic a posteriori. It
was this attempt which made him come up with synthetic a priori judg
ments. On this foundation Kant built his idea of transcendental idealism.
"^Ibid. , p. 105..
6The third chapter of the thesis deals with the analysis of God,
immortality, and freedom as postulated by Kant, basing it on the premise
of the bifurcation of the noumenal and the phenomenal. He argued his
case from the standpoint of morality �
The main thrust of the fourth chapter is a critical examination of
Kant's epistemological dualism pointing out its effects on religious
knowledge .
The fifth chapter is mainly concerned with the attempt to make some
suggestions or helpful alternatives in overcoming Kant's dualism.
chapter 2
PIETISTIC BACKGROUND OF IMMANUEL KANT
Immanuel Kant was the foremost thinker of the Enlightenment and one
of the great philosophers of all time, in whom was subsumed new trends
that had begun with rationalism, stressing reason, of Rene Descartes and
empiricism, stressing experience of Francis Bacon. He inaugurated a new
era in the development of philosophical thought.
Kant was born on April 22, 1724. He received infant baptism, the
following day. He was born in Konigsberg in East Prussia and lived in
that remote province for his entire life. The prayer or blessing at his
holy baptism was "May God preserve him in His covenant of grace into his
blessed end for Jesus Christ's sake. Amen."''" The words of this bless
ing show glimpses of the type of training he received early in his life.
His parents were devout members of rhe Pietist branch of the Luther
an Church which taught that religion belongs to the inner life, expressed
in simplicity and obedience to the moral law. His father was a saddler
by trade and a descendant of a Scottish imm.igrant. He is described by
Greene in these words: "He exemplified the virtues of industry and
truthfulness: preerai lently and moral rather than a religious man, his
2
chief interest was to make his children hard-working and upright."
Kant's mother, though uneducated, nevertheless displayed remarkable
Imxuanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans.
Theodore Meyer Greene (New York: Harper Touchbooks, 1960), p. 27-
^Ibid.
7
8character, natural intelligence and genuine piety. She a tremendous
influence upor. her son. She was more emotionally and ardently religious
than her husband. She was also more forceful in personality than he
was. Kant says of her:
My mother was a sweet-tempered, affectionate, pious and up
right woman and a tender mother, who led her children to the
fear of God by pious teaching and virtuous example. She often
took me outside of the city, directed my attention to the work
of God, expressed herself with a pious rapture over His omnip
otence, wisdom, and goodness, and impressed on my heart a deep
reverence for the creator of all things.^
Although Kant never ceased to speak of his m.other's influence upon his
life (she died when he was fourteen), Kant's father had more direct im
pact on his life.
Against the Pietistic backdrop which Kant's family showed, there
arose a counter-movement. Wolffian rationalism, with which is struggled.
Wolffian rationalism eventually was victorious. Both the city and Uni
versity of Konigsberg mirrored Pietism and Wolffian rationalism. The
defeat of Pietism in Konigsberg was delayed because of the influence of
Franz Albert Schultz.
Pietism originally had entered Konigsberg through a family which
employed a Pietist instructor for private tuition. This private tuition
grew until it became a full-fledged school later known as Collegium
Fridericianum, The school was strongly pietistic in its ethos and teach
ing. Schultz later became the leader of the school, and he tried to
oreserve and intensify its religious atmosphere as it had alwasy been.
Schultz, by his piety, intelligence and practical energy, had gained
high reputation and was highly regarded in Konigsberg, so much that he
impressed the stamp of his character on the intellectual life of the
city, cut off as it was by its remote situation from extraneous influ
ences. Some importance of the attempt of Kant's mediating and reconcil-
^Ibid.
9ing work could be attached to the fact that his early training was di
rected by a teacher who was one of the first to conceive the possibility
of combining the two great spiritual forces v/hich were then striving
for victory in German universities, Pietism and the Wolffian philosophy.
These two great forces were opposed throughout Germany, and they were
opposed to each other because:
The Wolffian philosophy was a dogmatic individualism in which
the speculative elements of the Leibnizian philosophy were
discarded, and all the truths of the reason were brought to
the bar of the understanding. On the other hand, the Pietists
in recoil from the rationalistic tendencies of the time, threw
themselves into a religion of feeling, and denounced the gat-
ural understanding as incapable of measuring divine truth.
What Shultz attempted to do was to take the good elements of the oppo-
sites and combine them. Shultz was a pupil of Wolff who best understood
his principles. He was singled out as the best pupil, and at the same
time was imbued with the spirit of Pietism. From Wolff he derived en
lightened views of education and a desire for a philosophical explana
tion or proof of his idea; whereas, from Pietism he derived a fervid
religious spirit and a belief in the efficacy of a strict and somewhat
5
ascetic, moral discipline. Shultz had some influence in the trend of
events in Konigsberg. It was the pastoral office that brought him into
contact with Kant's family which eventually led Immanuel to school.
Noticing the intellectual ability of the young Immanuel, the fourth
of the eleven children, Schultz encouraged and persuaded his parents
Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Vol.
(New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1968), p. 54.
^Ibid., p. 55.
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to send him to school. Thus it is said: "The influence of their pastor
made it possible for Kant, the fourth of eleven children but the eldest
surviving child, to obtain an education."^ At the age of eight Kant
v/as sent to the Collegium Fricdericianum, the Pietist school which his
pastor, Schultz, directed. During the eiglit and one-half years he was
there he acquired has lifelong love for the Latin classics. The pastor
maintained his interest in Kant until his adulthood and gave him much
good advice and generous assistance.^
Kant received his home education in a pietistic religious atmos
phere, and at the Collegium he met the same pietistic zeal. The curric
ulum of the Collegium was especially calculated to develop the moral
rather than the mental faculties of the pupils. The zeal at the Col
legium fostered toward a spirit of hypocrisy, and the students testified
to their religious experiences whether they were real or not. Kant,
who was brought up wiuh honest thought and simple affection as a daily
reality, cut himself from such short-cuts to favor. Indeed, Kant resent
ed the over-eraphssis of the religious as against the intellectual side
of his education. He disliked the endless catechisms, the ceremonious
formalities, the long hours of religious instruction, and the continual
round of prayers from breakfast timo until bedtime. The daily religious
activities of the Collegium, as paraphrased from Religion Within the
Limits of Reason , are as follows:
"Biographical iJote 1 �* J Ir^iTinnuel Kant 1724-1PG4" in Great Books of
the Western V.'orld , Vol.XLIl, ed,R. M. Hutcliinf. (London: Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. v.
7
Kc-'liqion Within the Lim.its of Reason A1 orio , p. 2n .
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1. Thirty minutes devotions at five-thirty in the morning.
2. Each class hour ended with a short but rousing prayer.
3. FIvery day a morning hour was devoted to religious instruction.
4. Each day ended with another thirty minutes of devotions at
nine in the evening.
Other religious activities included were: Communion service every fourth
week which was preceded by frequent assemibling of pupils to warn them of
the evil state of their souls and the need for discovery and confession
of sins. The Bible was literally used for secular subjects (studies) ,
and every Sunday was full of a weary succession of sermons and recita-
9
tion of catechism. This experience in the Collegium left such a great
impression on Kant's heart that later in his life he wrote: "Fear and
trembling overcame me whenever I recalled those days of youthful slavery."
As a result of his early acquired distaste for' formal religion, Kant
refused to attend public worship throughout his mature life."''"'" He abhor
red all religious emotion and had nothing to do with prayer or singing
of hymns for the rest of his life.
In spite of all this, Kant was not blind to the ethical values of
Pietism. He writes: "Say what you will of this doctrine, no one can
12
deny the sterling worth of the characters which it formed. And doubt
less it played no small part in the formation of Kant's character, for
his Pietist teachers and mot.her had given him "the highest thing that
man can possess
� that peace, that cheerful spirit, that inner harmony
with self which can be disturbed by no passion.""''^ Kant described the
8 9
Ibid.
10
Ibid. Ibid.
Henry Thorr.as and Dana Lee Thomas, Living Biographies of Great
Philosopher^ (Garden City: Blue Ribbon Books, 1946), p. 102.
12
Ibid, , p. 193.
13
Ibid.
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Pietists as distinguished in a manner deserving of all respect and that
they possessed the highest good v;hich man can enjoy. The Pietists can
not be discontented in tlie face of persecution, neither can they be
stirred to anger or <.:iimity in the face of controversy. He remarked that
the religious consciousness and the conceptions of virtue and piety of
Pititi.oin v/ere not satisfactory and clear, but he agreed that Pietism con
tained the root of the m.atter.
After eight years in the character-b\iilding school, the Collegium,
he entered the University of Konigsberg in 1740. He had to enroll in
the faculty of theology, the institution's requirement for every matric
ulated student, although his interest was more in mathematics and phy
sics. VJhi.le in the faculty of theology he had the jjrivilege of ground
ing himself thoroughly in philosophy.
Knutzen, who v/as Kant's most cherished teacher, had a great influ
ence on him. Knutzen was a Pietist who adopted the Wolffian rationalism.
He was a convinced Wolffian v\'ho made it his endeavor to effect a recon
ciliation between the opposing movements, as Shultz did. Knutzen stud
ied under Shultz, under whose influence he was converted to pietism at
the University of Konigsberg. He was always enthusiastic, outspoken,
and zealous about Wolffian philosophy. He later became a prominent
representative of Wolffianism. V'Jhile Shultz was satisfied v/ith an ex
ternal combination of the formal method ol the Vtolffian philosophy v;ith
the spirit cf pistisM, Kn.it?.en, a ma.n of greater speculative ability,
made a corrimcndablo advance to\;ard a real philosophical synthesis of the
14
two elcii-ients. As Kant's teacher, he had a considerable influence on
"''^Caird, p. 57.
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him. He urged Kant to the study of Nev/ton and gave him the use of his
own large library. Kant thus changed his mind from classics to science
and philosophy because of the influence of Knutzen whose lectures were
very interesting to him. Kant also began reading some writings of
Leibniz through the influence of Krmtzen. It could be concluded that
his first essay after the university was influenced by Knutzen. This
essay was a discussion of the opposing theories of the Cartesian and
the Leibnizian schools, in which the attempt was made to find a method
of reconciling them. Kant's theological v;ritings, which are pietistic
in character, must have also been influenced by Knutzen who gave us a
statement of Pietism at its best.
Chapter 3
THE NEED TO SYNTHESIZE RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM
Studies in the nature and meaning of human knowledge had become
almost the only concern of philosophers by the middle of the eighteenth
century. Leibniz emphasized the power of mind; Locke emphasized ideas
as objects of experience; Berkeley was concerned with ideas as the sole
objects of experience. British empiricism, had quite logically developed
into a skepticism concerning not only causality but also general ideas,
universal judgments, and the knowledge of substances or natures. On the
other hand, rationalism had insisted on the a priori power of the mind
and thus proposed a dogm.atic type of philosophy which sought to discover
its empirical origins.
With his pietistic background, Immanuel Kant came in contact with
the rationalistic spirit and the methods of critical analysis which was
prevalent in the German universities of his day. He became acquainted
with the writings of Newton, Rousseau, Wolff, Hume, and others. Accord
ing to Hume, men are confined to their thinking about morality to the
changing facts of sense impressions. Hume therefore rejected all super
natural and metaphysical support for morality. Virtue is merely what
gives the pleasing sense of approval. Reason deals with the relations
between ideas, but the discovery of these relations does not yield moral
judgments. Kant was thus forced to inquire into the nature of mind,
reason, and the moral life. Faced with this situation, Kant sought to
14
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save what might be the valid insights of both developments and, at the
same time, to avoid their excesses.
Kant was faced with the question, "What can we know?" and he attempted
to answer it. There is an outer world of ultimate reality (noumena or
things-in-themslves) which is unknown and unknowable by the ordinary
process of sense perception. On the other hand, the world of nature or
the realm of experience (phenomena) is the realm of human knowledge.
In knowing the phenomenal world, something comes through the channels
of the senses and something is contributed by the mind itself. In Kant's
thoughts, the mind was active and formed into a system of knowledge all
the material brought in by the various senses. The mind has an innate
way of working, and the conception of the outer world, including the
notions of space, time, causation, and the laws of nature, is due to the
forms of thought (categories) which exist previous to experience and
which the mind projects upon nature. These categories of the mind help
in one's interpretation of the world. In this way Kant attempted to
harmonize the rationalism and the empiricism of his day.
The question in the controversy between rationalism and empiricism
is: Does one possess an a priori or rational knowledge of objects?
Rationalism will give an affirmative answer that by pure thought one
reaches an absolute knowledge of things that cannot be acquired through
the senses. Empiricism will deny the statement that a knowledge of ob
jects is gained solely by perception, when it follows that one has no
absolute knowledge.
Kant's standpoint is that he took what he regarded as the correct
iialf of each of the two opposing theories and combined these halves into
16
a new theory. He renewed the old dogma of rationalism in opposition
to Hume's empiricism that, "There is a priori knowledge of objects."
In opposition to the rationalism, of the Leibniz-Wolffian system, he add
ed, "but knowledge of things only as they appear, not as they are in
2
themselves," The real characteristic feature of Kantian epistemology
is the union of phenomenalism or idealism with rationalism. Rationalism
had always been realistic while empiricism had become idealistic with
Berkeley and Hume.
In the first half of Critique of Pure Reason, in which he dealt
with Aesthetic and Analytic, Kant attempted to construct a new episte
mological system upon this basis. In the second half consisting of
Dialectic , he gave an elaborate exposition of the relation of the new
philosophy to the old metaphysics. It showed the impossibility of a
purely rational psychology, cosmology, and theology, the impossibility
of a realistic rationalism, after the first half had shown the possibil
ity of a phenomenalistic rationalism. We shall begin with the condi
tional reconstruction of rationalism.
As far as Hume is concerned, there is no universal and necessary
judgments concerning matters of fact. The natural laws, the laws of
mechanics and of chemistry and physiology, and even the causal law it
self, have universal validity only. To this Kant says it is complete
skepticism, because if Hume is right, then there is no possibility of
real knowledge, for universality and necessity distinguish knowledge
"''Paulsen, p. 390.
^Ibid..
17
from mere association of ideas which even animals have. Hume's skepti
cism also necessarily includes mathematics. The actual existence of
this science shows the insufficiency of the principles of empiricism.
The question, therefore, is sim.ply to show how such sciences are pos
sible. "Accepting the existence of mathematics as factual and the physi
cal sciences as true sciences, and noting that in metaphysics there was
at once a lack of progress being made and a long history of violent dis-
3
agreements among metaphysicians," Kant proceeded to ask two questions:
"Hov/ are mathematics and physics possible as sciences?" and "Is meta-
4
physics possible as a science?" What Kant was asking, m a general
form.ula is, "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible, epistemo-
logically?" To put the question in anotner way: How can propositions
that are derived from experience (judgments a priori) and are not logi
cal deductions (not analytical propositions) possess the validity and
the value of objective knowledge (synthetic judgments)? In answering
this question Kant made natural sciences the norm for all scientific
knowledge. He found two factors in studying scientific judgments: that
there is an increase in knowledge, rather than a tautological repeti
tion in the predicate of what was already known in the subject of the
judgment. These judgments he called synthetic; a.nd that there are the
notes of universality and necessity rather than the particularity and
Reginald F. O'Neill, Readings in Epistemology (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Kail, Inc., 1962), p. 175.
^
Immanuel Kant, Prolegom.ena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans.
Lewis White Beck ( Indianpolis : Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing,
1962) , p. 27-
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contingency which characterizes the objects of sense experience. These
judcm.ents he called a priori. The physical sciences are possible pre
cisely because they are enunciated in synthetic a priori judqraents.
Kant's ansv^er, then, is that such propositions which are judgments
a priori and are not analytic can have objective validity, only in case
the understanding itself creates the objects of which it affirms these
propositions; it has an a priori ]:nowledge of objects insofar as it pro-
5
duces them itself. This happens in mathematics and physics. Its ob-
jecs are purely intuitions constructed according to definition. The
geometrician './ill be able to describe the properties and relations of
lines, angles, trianles, and circles in synthetic judgment a priori be
cause he created the objects himself. As for the physicist, the objects
he deals vrith are natural phenomena. Phenomena are the products of the
subject. Hence, insofar as is meant by nature, the totality of phenom
ena and physics deals v/ith nature in this sense only. V^e can have an
a priori knowledge of nature and of all natural objects. On the other
hand, it will be difficult to have a priori ]cnov/ledge of nature if na
ture is taken to mean an absolute reality that exists without any rela
tion to the knowing subject. Of things as they are in themselves, inde
pendent of the subject, the intellect can, of course, not know anything
a priori. Neither can the intellect learn anything concerning them by
the a posteriori method j for they would have to enter one's conscious
ness or become phenomena before anything could be 'cnown about them..
Therefore, if metaphysics neans Irnowledge of things-in-theraselves , then
Paulsen, p. 391.
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it is an inpossible science. Kar.t applied this synthetic a priori juda-
nent to conclude that laetaphysics as a science is irnpossible .
What Kant sees the metaphysician doing is ignoring experience en
tirely, to ta!:e certain categories or principles of unity as the objects
v/ith which the mind is equipped, and to project these mental categories
outside the mind as though they v/ere characteristics of reality. The
true function of these categories is to rnaJie possible the inteqration of
various sense presentations. Metaphysics uses them as though they be
longed to extra m.ental reality, and hence its procedure is not scientific
Kant's attempt to reconcile empirical or experiential elements of
knovjledqe r/ith intellectual dynamism v/as needed. The basic problem un
derlying his philosophy is his uncritical acceptance of a rationalistic
concept of reason. Human reason, it must be understood, is not the tot
ally independent a priori power v/hich rationalism has pictured. In its
functions it is dependent upon, and worJcs in close collaboration '''ith,
sense experience. In v/hat can be seriously grasped, the human mind is
able to discover intelligible aspects, so that it is neither subject to
the limits of sensation nor arbitrary or a priori in its pronouncements.
In the Criti.que of Pure Reason, Kant's main concern is ro undertalce
the possibility of a philosophical science of nature. Though this had
been achieved in Neu'tonian physics, the concern of Kant is the possibil
ity cf explaining the rational basics of such a science of nature. The
essential characteristic of such a philosophical science of nature is
that it has universal and absolute ".nov/ledge of the objects of sensible
experience. The impossibility of understanding such ]:no"ledQe had been
brought about by the rationalism and empiricism, of the preceding period.
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This v;as because of the demarcation of the area of knowledge between
a priori analysis and synthetic a posteriori. By the a priori analysis,
which begins v/ith concepts, it was impossible to reach the obiects of
experience by the pure analysis of the concepts. whereas, synthesis
a posteriori, v/hich taking its departure in the fluid and the contingent
reports of the senses and synthesizing such reports, could never reach
5
the universality and absolute necessity of philosophical principles.
One thing that must be kept in mind is that Kant v/as looking for a syn
thesis in which he could find universality and necessity in the
principles.
To resolve this partition between a priori analysis and synthetic
a posteriori, Kant suggested that the real operation of pure reason v/as
a synthetic a priori. By this Kant v/as thinking of the unification of
the reports or data of the senses on principles v/hich are not themselves
derived from experience, and v/hich have no reality or validity except in
the actual operation of tnat synthesis. The v/ork of this operation was
to achieve the unification of the data of sensible experiences which are
immanent to that experience but are not derived from experience.
The synthesis in which the reality of pure reason consists, and
which F.akes possible a genuinely philosophical science of nature, takes
place in three stages. Firstly there is the aesthetic in which sensa
tions are conbined into unitary perceptions; secojidly, the analytic,
in v/hich the perceptions of the aesthetic level are combined by the un
derstanding according to concepts; and thirdly, the dialectic, in which
A. Robert Caponigri, A History of IJestern Philosophy, Vol. Ill
(Chicago: Henry Regneny Company, 1963), p. 451.
the juclqrnents of exjjerience, achieved by means of the concepts of the
understanding, are united into metaphysical knowledge by means of ideas,
or most genera] principles, of understanding. These stages lay in a
continuum because they are interdependent. They must be conceived to
lay along a continuum, whose terms are unity and multiplicity. Each
stage presupposes the previous and builds upon it, with no real breaks
in the process, and each stage also mar.ks an advancement from the multi
plicity of sensation to the unity of a metaphysical principle, by means
of the synthetic a priori process. It is only by the unity of the syn
thetic process that there can be that unity of objective reference.
This is what Kant purports to establish: "Knowledge even at the point of
highest unification, the metaphysical, is still knowledge of the objects
of sensible experience, though according to a higher principle of unifi
cation or synthesis, and therefore viith a higher degree of universality
and necessity."^ Kence, his purp>ose v/as to disengage and identify the
formal principles according to v\/hich unification or synthesis is achie
ved at each level.
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Transcendental Aesthetic�Space and Time
Kant proceeds to mention the principle, or principles, accordinq to
which synthetic a priori is achieved at the transcendental aesthetic
level, V7hich is "the science of all principles of a priori sensibility."'
This first level deals irlth perception. These principles are the forms
of sensibility which are the principles according to which synthesis of
the multiplicity of sensibility is achieved at the level of perception
formally or abstractly. Kant identifies these forms of sensibility or
pure form of sensible intuition, serving as two principles of a priori
9
kuox;ledge, nam.ely, space and tirrie. The manifold sensations of sensi
bility are imified under these two forms. The objects of sensibility
appear first of all as objects in space and time; For Humean empiri
cists, sensibility is without these forms, but there exists a momient of
consciousness in the subject v/hich v/ould be pure sensation. For Kant,
objects of the senses are perceived in time and space because the forms
of time and space are the universal and necessary principles of the per
ception of natural objects.
He started to deal v;ith this section of the transcendental elements
by mentionina that space and time are intuitions, not concepts. Space
cannot be derived from empirical concepts; it is just a necessary
a priori representation v/hich underlies all outer intuitions or outer
appearances. "Space is not a discursive or, as v/e say, general concept
Inimanuel Kant, Kant's Selections, ed. Theodore Meyer Greene (Nev/
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919) , p. 45.
^IriT'ianuel .Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith
(New Yor':: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1961), p. 67.
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of relations of thinqs in 'general, but a pure intuition . "'^'^ Kant says
this because one can represent only one space, and even i:*^ divided into
parts, the parts, cannot precede the one all-embracinq space. Since
space is one, to tali- of a general concept of space is solely dependent
on li-^.itations . In this case, an a priori intuition underlies the con
cepts of space, and it is 'vith apodeictic certainty."'"^ Kant says the
sarr.e thinq of time when he mentions : "Time is not ... a oeneral con-
12
cept,' but a pure form of sensible intuition." Time cannot be removed
in respect of appearances; hence it is given a priori. The actuality of
appearances is possible in it alone. I-7hile appearance may vanish, time
itself rem.ains. Time has just one dim.ension like space, and its prin
ciples are grounded upon a priori necessity, not derived from experience "
Different times are parts of one time whose representation is possible
only throuah intuition. The proposition is synthetic, hence its deriva
tion cannot be from concepts alone.
Kant also mentions that space and time are infinite, and are logic
ally prior to objects, and can exist in the absence of any objects. He
v/rites: "We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space,
13
though we can quite wall think of it as empty of objects." He contin-
14
ues: "Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude." Since no
10 11 , . n
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object can be thought of as containing an infinite nuraber of representa
tions within itself, that is why space is thought of as coexisting with
the infinite, for representation of space is an a priori intuition, not
a concept. As for time, he says, "We cannot, in respect of appearances
in general remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as
void of appearances .
Kant also says that space and time are unitary, that all spaces
are parts of one and the same space, all times are parts of one and the
same time; that every part is spatially related to every other and every
instant temporally related to every other. "We can represent to our
selves of one space, and we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby
16
only parts of one and the same unique space." "Different times are
but parts of one and the same time.""''^
Kant also sees that there is a very intimate connection between
space and time, and mathematics. Kant attem.pts to show against Hume
that one can have substantive knowledge of the world a priori in the
form of general truths of mathematics and physics. The necessity of
mathematics is thus justified in the aesthetic. The necessity of mathe
matics is guaranteed by the central role of space and time in our exper
ience. "The apodeictic certainty of all geometrical propositions, and
the possibility cf their a priori construction, is grounded in this
a priori necessity of space.
"'''^ "The possibility of apodeictic princi
ples concerning the relations of time, or of axioms of time in general,
�19
is also grounded upon this a prion necessity.'
�"�^
Ibid., p. V!5 Ibid., p. 69. Ibid., p. 75
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Another doctrine stressed along this way is that objects of experi
ence (tables, chairs) , are necessarily spatial and temporal. The only
objects one could perceive are the ones in spatial and temporal posi
tion. Notions of space and time are logically prior to experience. They
are pure forms of all sensible intuition, which give an essentially
basic structure to experience. "Space is a necessary a priori repre-
20
sentation which underlies all outer intuitions," There is a differ
ence between space and time; it is a difference betv/een outer sense and
inner sense. Whereas all experiences are temporal, only some of them,
the sense impressions, are spatial. All experiences are of inner sense,
21
the form of which is space.
Kant proceeded to discuss the necessary conditions of a possible
experience. His Transcendental Idealism is essentially a mixture of
certain rationalist doctrines and the idealism of Berkeley which is that
every object that exists must be perceivable. The rationalist tradition
emerges in the fotTn of a distinction between things as they appear or
phenom.ena, or sensible; and things-in-themselves or noumena or intel
ligible things. Kant was looking for essential features of knowledge
of things as they appear, the spatial and temporal objects around us,
and that there can be no knowledge of things as they are in themselves,
of the non-spatial and non-temiporal objects cf the intelligible world.
Here the bifurcation between the phenomena and the noumena, the sensible
and the intelligible, appearance and things- in-themselves--which Kant
combined to develop throughout his writings�begins to be seen. He even
Wilkerson, p. 23.Ibia.
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went further to assert that there are strictly no things as they appear
independent of perceptions of them. Just as Berkeley insisted that
strictly there are no objects, that there are only perceivers and their
ideas, so also Kant insisted that strictly there are no things as rhey
appear, but that there are only perceivers and their representation.
The external world is constructed by the mind, by the joint efforts of
sensibility and understanding, and "if the subject, or even only the
subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole
constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay
22
space and time themselves, would vanish." In his illustration of rain
to show it as mere representations, he says, "not only are the drops of
rain mere appearances, but even their round shape, nay even the space in
which they fall, are nothing in themselves, but merely modifications or
fundamental form.s of our sensible intuition, and that the transcendental
23
object remains unknows to us." He also says "... what we call outer
objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the
..24
form of which is space.
Kant went further to clarify himself on this issue, that the fact
that these things were mere appearances does not mean that he was talking
of illusion, but that it was applying objective reality to these forms
of representation that caused it to become impossible to prevent every
thing being transformed into mere illusion. In other words, as long
as it is objective validity and subjective reality, it is no illusion.
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 82.
Ibid., p. 85. Ibid., p. 75,
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but if it is subjective validity and objective reality, then illusion
comes in- Though he patronizingly referred to Berkeley, yet he accused
. . 25
nirti of degrading bodies to mere illusion.
Transcendental idealism helps us to understand Kant's compromise of
the prima facie tv/o ways of thinking mathematics theorems. Instead of
regarding them as necessary or analytic or a priori truths, and as con
tingent or synthetic or a posteriori truths, Kant argued that they are
synthetic and a priori. They are not analytic truths, but not derived
from experience. Kant claimed, therefore, that mathematical truths are
synthetic a priori. Transcendental Idealism says that the general prop
erties of the world around us are strictly properties of ourselves, pat
terns according to v;hich our minds construct the world. So also, the
theorems or truths of mathematics are synthetic, but they are a priori
for they are functions of the human faculty of sensibility.
A priori meant a lot to Kant, thus according to him we cannot ex
plain the necessity cf mat>'ematics unless we resort to Transcendental
Idealism. If the realist view is taken, that space and time are prop
erties of objects ir dependent of any perceivers, then we "can neither
account for the possibility of a priori mathematical knowledge, nor
2i
bring the propositions of experience into necessary agreement with it.'.'
Kant dismissed the notion of space as absolute by calling it "an
27
emoty fabrication of the reason which pertains to the v/orld of faith."
75 26
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In the Prole jorrena to Any Future Metaphysics, he gave the final idealist
solution to the problem when he said:
Those w'lo cannot yet rid themselves of the notion that space
and time are actual qualities inherent in things-in-themselves
may exercise their acumen on the following paradox (the prob
lem of incongruous counterparts) . When they have in vain at
tempted its solution and are free from prejudices at least
for a fev; moments, they will suspect that the degradation of
space and time to mere ^^orms of our sensuous intui tion may
p>erhaps be well-founded.
Transcendental Analytic
Kant turned to the second stage of his attempt to discover the nec
essary conditions of a possible experience. In this stage he gave an
account of the a priori contribution of understanding the faculty of
concepts. The analytic is to yeild pure concepts or categories. The
analytic is divided into two parts: the Analytic of Concepts and the
Analytic of Principles.
The discussion of the Analytic of Concepts begins with the idea of
a Transcendental Logic, in which the attempt is made to discover the
pure concepts of understanding the categories. First, the assumption is
made that the faculty of understanding, which brings intuitions under
concent, has a more general use in general logic. The faculty which
helps in organizing perceptions is the faculty responsible for inference.
This faculty has the general taslc of thinking; hence it is called reason,
and the specific task of thinking about objects is called understanding,
A person has one intellectual faculty which has a general task in logic
and a more specific task in making judgments about objects. He writes:
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 32.
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Logic . . . can be treated . . . either as logic of the gener
al or as logic of the special employment of the understanding.
The former contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought
without which there can be no employment whatsoever of the
understanding. . . . The logic of the special employment of
the understanding contains the ru^^s of correct thinking as
regards a certain kind of objects.
So then, to discover the pure concepts of understanding, one must list
the concepts of general logic. The main formal features of thinking of
anything are listed, and then the main formal features of thinking about
objects of experience are derived, "The functions of the understanding
can be discovered if we can give an exhaustive statement of the func
tions of unity in judgements . "'^'^ Kant himself proceeded to give the
categories of judgment and understanding as follows:
Table of Judgements
Quantity of Judgements
Universal
Particular
Singular
Quality
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite
Relation
Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive
Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodeictic
31
Critique of Pure Reason, p, 93.
Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., p. 107.
30
Table of Categories
Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
Of Quality Of Relation
Reality Of Inherence and
Negation Subsistence
Limitation Of Causality and
Dependence
(Cause and effect)
Of Community (rec
iprocity between
agent and patient)
Of Modality
Possibility� Impossibility
Existence--Non-existengg
Necessity�Contingency
What Kant was trying to shov7 in this section was that human knowledge
arises out of the faculty of sense impressions and thinking. Hence he
v;rote :
Without sensibility no object would be given to us and v/ithout
the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts with
out content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.
. . . These two pov/ers or faculties cannot exchange their func
tions. The understanding is incapable of intuiting, and the
senses are incapable of thinking. It is only fi^^^ the united
cooperation of the two that knowledge can arise.
Real knowledge therefore arises out of the cooperation of the two. Here
is the elem.ent of Kant's attempt to synthesize sense date and an a priori
structural faculty, or empiricism and rationalism.
Judgment is another faculty he emphasized side by side with knowl
edge: "We can reduce all operations of the understanding to judgements,
so that the understanding can be represented as the power of judging.
3 3
Ibid. , P. 113. Ibid. , p. 94
31
For it is according to what has been said above, a power of thinking."
Kant saw the power of thinking and judging to be the same, because to
judge if to synthesize, v/hich he classified into twelve categories.
There is no doubt chat he drew from Aristotle to form these categories,
for he says, "These concepts we shall with Aristotle, call categories;
35
for our primary purpose is the same as his." In another place he says
"It was an enterprise worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle to meike
36
search for these fundamental concepts." These tables of judgments
and tables of categories correspond to each other.
Transcendental Deduction
The main section of the Transcendental Analytic is Transcendental
Deduction. In the first part an explanation is given of the term Trans
cendental Deduction which is a criticism of Locke and Kume, who attempt
ed to derive the categories a posteriori, and a further insistence that
knowledge requires both concepts and intuitions.
In the second part of this section the general object is to examine
the a priori contribution of understanding to experience, and to isolate
the pure concepts of understanding the categories. These are concepts
of objects, external things which are perceived but exist independently
of our perceiving them. By these concepts of understanding is proven
that skepticism about the existence of the external worJ.d is misplaced,
and thus has avoided Huinean skepticism with regard to the senses.
The assumption then, is that there is a series of experiences or
Ibid., p. 306. Ibid., p. 113. Ibid,, 114.
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states of consciousness or "representations" which can be only through
the experience of a person who employs concepts of objects independent
37
of himself. The argumient is in these steps'.
1. There is a series of representations, ordered in time.
2. For such a series to be possible, the representations
must be synthesized; that is, taken up and connected in
one consciousness, brought to the necessary unity of ap
perception. That is, they m.ust be connected according to
the various a priori forms of synthesis.
3. The forms in question are the categories, already listed
in the Metaphysical Deduction. Therefore,
4. The categories, pure concepts of understanding, concepts
of objects, must have application in experience.
Taking representation to mean experience, Kant seems to take the
position of the empiricists: Hume, Descartes, and others, but he avoids
their mistakes. He makes certain statements to illuminate the obscurity
of Descartes' cognito argument. Some of the frequent echoes of Descartes
are: "It must be possible for the 'think' to accompany all my repre-
38
sentations." "I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself,
39
nor as I am in myself, but o.nly that I am." What Kant is arguing for
is that the thought must be accompanied by representation because some
thing would be represented which cannot be thought at all. The synthesis
is here mentioned again. He also argues that one must be aware of him
self, hence he mentions that the principle of the necessary unity of ap
perception is a necessary truth and that it is an identical analytic
proposition. This analytic unity of apperception is possible only
40
under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity- One m.ust be
�?7 38
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aware of, and bf? able to see, a v-ontinuing distinction between himself
and the external. Self-awareness and awareness of the external world or
objects are irretrievably connected. Hence Kant differs from the empir
icists of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, who separate
the tv/o.
This representation, which can be given prior to all thought, is
entitled intuition; hence Kant said, ". , .in order to knov/ ourselves,
there is required in addition to the act of thought ... a determinate
mode of intuition. . . . The consciousness of self is thus very far
41
from, being a knowledge of the self."
The Theory of Synthesis
This section of the Transcendental Deduction is an account cf the
workings of the mind, especially the faculty of understanding in organ
izing, connecting, and classifying experiences. This theory of synthe
sis gives special sense to the expression "synthesis a priori." He de
fined synthesis as follows: "By synthesis, in its most general sense, I
imderstand the act of putting different representations together, and of
42
grasping what is manifold in them in one (act of) knowledge," This
synthesis is pure only if the manifold is given a priori. In this case,
this synthetic a priori combines diverse representations in a single
judgment .
According to Kant, it is the job of understanding and imagination
to synthetize the manifold of intuitions which sensibility produces.
Ibid. , p 168. Ibid., p. 111.
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This faculty of imagination is merely empirical. All the different ex
periences, disorganized, must be sorted into a fairly coherent picture
of the world, to connect the experiences of one person.
This synthesis is important in that it is historical. Kant steered
a roiddle course between rationalism and empiricism in his first Critique.
He ai^gued there that knowledge required both concepts and intuitions.
The rationalist, on the one hand, attempted to obtain knowledge from
concepts alone while the empiricists, on the other hand, attempted to
obtain knowledge from intuitions alone. Thus Kant attacked rationalism
because one can have substantive knowledge claims only about objects of
experience, which one could in principle perceive. While empiricism
regards perception m.erely as the passive reception of sense impressions,
Kant insisted that the sense impressions must be actively connected,
classified, organized, if knowledge of the external world is to be gained
As Kant would say, "The passive faculty of sensibility can only yield
knowledge in conjunction with the active faculty of understanding; the
43
passively received intuitions must be brought under concepts." Of
course minds must actively digest the information passively received in
order to give what is going on.
'^''ibid., p- 163.
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Transcendental Dialectic
In this section Kant invoked a faculty model to explain why many
metaphysicians are tempted to make vacuous claims, why their investiga
tions take them beyond the limits of a possible experience. They are
misled by the faculty of reason. Thus Kant turned to the consideration
of a priori synthetic judgments in metaphysics. Metaphysics cuts itself
off from sense experience in attempting to go beyond it and, for this
reason, fails to attain a single a priori synthetic judgment. To just
ify this claim, Kant analyzed the use that mietaphysics makes of the con
cept of the unconditioned. The faculty of reason, according to Kant,
seeks for the unconditioned or absolute in three distinct spheres:
firstly, in the rational or philosophical psychology, it seeks for an ab
solute subject of knowledge; secondly, in the rational cosmology or
sphere of cosmology, it seeks for an absolute beginning of things in
time for an absolute limit to them in space and for an absolute limit to
their divisibility; and thirdly, in the sphere of rational theology, it
44
seeks for an absolute condition of all things. Kant thus emphasized
that there are three kinds of illusion of reason or pseudo-rational
inferences which search for an unconditioned concept. The first is on
Paralogisms (soul) ; the second is on the Antinomies (extent of the uni
verse) ; and the third is on the ideal of Pure Reason (God) . Kant claimed
to show that the attempt is doom.ed to failure by leading to an antimony
in which equally good reasons can be given for both the affirmative and
the negative position Thus it i s that Kant repudiated the possibility
of knowledge through pure concepts of things as they really are.
44 Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed-, s.v, "Kant, Immanuel."
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Kant showed that reason goes beyond the sphere of experiences when
he asserted: "Reason concerns itself exclusively with absolute totality
in the employment of the concepts of the understanding, and endeavours
to carry the synthetic unity, which is thought in the category, up to
45
the completely unconditioned." The elements of Kant's epistemological
dualism can be easily seen here because he was insisting that categories
(understanding) cannot go beyond the condition which exists in time and
space, for it has no transcendental applicability. Reason searches for
comprehensive explanations by which it is inevitably led beyond the lim
its of a possible experience, because it uses concepts to which no intu
itions correspond, hence Kant said: "They are transcendent and overstep
the limits of all experience; no object adequate to the transcendental
46
idea can ever be found within experience."
For Kant, none of the three ideas was really a part of experrence.
No one ever had an experience of one's own soul, the noumenal world or
God; hence no knowledge of them, except that they are important as guides
to knov/ledge. In short, without the ideas of a soul, a world, and a
God, there would be no way to organize knowledge. Knowledge about the
soul, the world, and God is impossible because one could know for sure
what is in one's own mental states, and although there is something be
yond these mental states, one cannot know what it is. One could not
gain the knowledge of what really is from reason or sense experience.
The ideas of reason only act as a regulative force which directs the
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 318.
Ibid. , p. 319.
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search for knowledge and limits the reason itself to the phenomenal
world. Kant asserted: "It is thus evident that reason has here no oth
er purpose than to prescribe its own formal rule for the extension of
its empirical employment, and not any extension beyond all limits of
world, and God) would be very helpful at this point.
Paralogism of Pure Reason
In the Paralogism of Pure Reason, Kant attacked rational psychology
which was founded upon Descartes' account of persons. There are tv;o
main things which Descartes emphasized in his commonly known proposi
tion� "Cognito, ergo sum" or "I think, therefore I am (exist).'' One
of the emphases is the causal theory of perception that external things
cause certain perceptions and their existence is inferred from our per
ceptions. The other thing is that people are essentially non-physical
minds or souls attaciied to physical bodies. In an attempt to find knowl
edge, Descartes decided to doubt everything, including himself, but he
found that the process of doubting affirmed his own existence, because
he was a thinking thing. "This proposition: I am, I exist, is necessar
ily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive
48
it." But he went farther +-han this by saying that thinking substances
are non-spatial, non-extended, whereas physical substances are spatial.
He thus separates a thinking substance and a physical substance. A per
son is thus a non-physical substance, the real person is not the body
empirical employment. If
47
The analysis of these three great ideas (self.
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which v;e see, but he possesses the body; as he asserted:
Although I possess a body with v/hich I am very intimately con
joined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and dis
tinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and ex
tended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea
of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking
thing, it is certain that this I (that is to say, my soul by
v/hich I am what I am) , is entirely agg absolutely distinct
from my body, and can exist without it.
In refutation of these views of Descartes, Kant gave four paralog
isms which correspond to the table of categories (understanding) , by
beginning with the category of substance. Thus Kant said that the topic
of the rational doctrine of the soul is as follows:
1. The soul is substance.
2. As regards its quality it is simple.
3. As regards the different times in which it exists, it is
numerically identical,, that is, unity (not plurality).
Cf)
4. It is in relation to possible obnects m space.
These four conclusions are each supposed to prove something about the
soul .
This substance, merely as object of inner sense, gives the
concept of immateriality; as simple substance, that of incor
ruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, person
ality; all these three together, spirituality; while the rela
tion to objects of space gives commercium with bodies, and
so leads to represent the thinking substance as the principle
of life in matter, that is, as soul (anima) , and as the ground
of animality. This last, in turn, as limited by spirituality
gives the concept of immortality .
5-'-
Kant gave three main objections to Descartes' discussion or ac
count of people. Firstly he objected that the soul as discussed by
Descartes (Cartesian soul) , is not and could not be an object of a pos
sible experience. Since knowledge requires both concepts and intuitions
4g 50. , �
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the knowledge-claim that there are Cartesian souls is not proper. He
thus said that we may have a clear concept of a simply, unitary, non-
physical substance but there can be no corresponding intuitions or per
ceptions of such things:
I do not know an object merely in that I think but only insofar
as I determine a given intuition with respect to the unity of
consciousness in which all thought consists. Consequently, I
do not know myself through being conscious of myself as think
ing, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself
as determined with respect to the function of thought.
One can have knowledge of his experiences but not of any soul substance.
Secondly, Kant criticized Descartes by asserting that even if one
concedes that the concept of a Cartesian soul-substance makes sense, it
is difficult to see how it could be made to yield any criteria of per
sonal identity. Descartes does not guarantee that each person consists
of one soul, and so V7e have no way of telling it, but one can count only
the numi:)er of experiences, which means that there might be as many souls
as experiences. Kant illustrated with balls:
An elastic ball which impinges on another similar ball in a
straight line communicates to the latter its whole motion,
and therefore its whole state (that is, if we take account
only of the positions in space). If, then, in analogy with
such bodies , we postulate substances such that the one commun
icates to the other representations together with the con
sciousness of them, we can conceive a whole series to the sec
ond, the second to its own state together with its conscious
ness to the second, the second its own state with that of the
preceding substance to the third, and this in turn the states
of all the preceding substances together with if^^ ^^n con-
scioustiess and with their consciousness to another."
Since the soul -substances are unobservable they would do less v/ork than
experiences which are observable.
Ibid. , p. 368.
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Thirdly, Descartes claimed that non-physical minds (people) and
physical bodies are of different kinds, but that there are causal rela
tions betv;een mind and body. That is to say that our perceptions are
the result of certain happenings in the physical world. Kant's criti
cism of this is that the causal relation between non-physical mind and
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physical body is unintelligible. Kant argued that the inference from
perceived effects to the unperceivable causes is extremely shaky. There
is, in principle, no way of checking the inference since further observ
ation will only yield further perceptions and will not bring one any
nearer the objects themselves. There can, therefore, be no guarantee
that perceptions are caused by external objects, and they cannot give an
accurate impression of the objects' properties: "All our sensuous rep-
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resentations are inadequate to establish their reality."
In the fourth paralogism, Kant discusses Transcendental Idealism,
and there is a clear indication of the distinction between things-in-
themselves or noumena and things as they appear or phenomena. In fact,
he said that we have to first distinguish between two types of idealism,
the transcendental and the empirical. "3y transcendental idealism I
mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and
all, representations only, not things-in-themselves, and that time and
space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determina
tions given as existing by themselves, no conditions of objects viewed
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as things-in-themselves," Things-in-themselves, or the noumena, are
"
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non-spatial and non-temporal, and they are not therefore possible ob
jects of human experience. Things as they appear, or the phenomena,
are the ordinary spatial and temporal objects of our experience. Things
as they appear are collections of perceptions. This is what Kant meant
by empirical realisiri as against transcendental idealism. "External ob
jects (empirical objects) are mere appearances, and are therefore noth
ing but a species of m.y representations, the objects of which are some
thing only through these representations. Apart from them they are
nothing.
With this distinction between the noumena and the phenomena, Kant
would argue that people in themselves must be distinguished from people
as they appear. His ethical plans committed him to talking of noumenal
people, of selves-in-themselves � He talked of "the being which thinks
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in us" or "the being itself." The transce.ndental (noum.enal) self
cannot be experienced because all experiences must come through time
and space.
The A..ntinom.ies of Pure Reason
The hypothetical form of inference provides the basics for the cos
mological ideas. With these ideas, when reason out of its own nature
necessarily se^iks the unconditioned, it appears unable to avoid arriving
at two viev/s that are in direct contradiction with each other. Reason
thus appears to contain antinomies; it seems co be dialectical and in
conflict with itself.
Har
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The Antinomies played a special part in the composition of the
Critique of Pure Reason, for his general dissatisfaction with rational
ist metaphysics concentrated on a number of contradictions. a letter
to Professor Christian Garve, September 21, 1798, Kant wrote:
As I cursorily perused your book, I came across your note on
page 339, with regard to which I must lodge a protest. The
point from which I started was not the inquiry about exist
ence of God, immortality and so on. It was the Antinomies.
The world has a beginning, it has no beginning, and so on to
the fourth: there is freedom in man, there is .no freedom. It
was they that awakened me from my dogmatic slumber and drove
me to a critique of our Reason, in order to remove the scandal
of an apparent contradiction of Reason with itself .^^
TTiat the antinomies is central in Kant's epistemology is evidenced
in a letter to Marcus Hertz, May 11, 1781, in which he wrote:
This kind of investigation will always remain difficult, and
sometimes I harbour a scheme in my mind as to hov/ it might
also gain popularity- To attempt that right at the start when
the ground .had first to be cleared, would have been improper.
Otherwise I should have started with the chapter on the antin
omies, which might have been done in a very flourishing style
and would have roused the reader's desire to investigate the
sources of this conflict. But first the claims of the scgjol
must be satisfied, later, one may try to please the world.
It is in the Antinomies that Kant did justice to this general claim
that reason investigates various series of conditions in an attempt to
discover the ab?.olutely unconditioned. He also examined attempts to
discover complete series of explanatory conditions. There are four
kinds of absolute totality and fo\ir kinds of search for a complete series
of explanatory conditions. In every case reason urges pursuing the
search until the series of conditions is completed, until the absolutely
unconditioned is reached, but in every case it seems that reason runs
Ibid . Ibid, , pp. 112-13,
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into difficulties of antinomies. This is because it is attempting to
62use categories completely divorced from experience.
Kant discussed four antinomies. In each he stated a thesis and
an antithesis to show the apparent contradiction. The four theses rep-
6 3
resent the side of dogmatism, the natural views of a rationalist. The
four antitheses represent the side of empiricism^ ^ or the natural view
of an empiricist. The four antimonies are:
1. Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited
as regards space.
Antithesis: The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it
is infinite as regards both time and space.
2. Thesis: Every composite substance in the world is made up of
simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the
simple or what is composed of the simple.
Antithesis: No composite thing in the world is made up of simple
part3, and there nowhere exists in the world anything
simple.
3. Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the
only causality from which the appearances of the world
can one and all be derived. To explain these appear
ances it is necessary to assume that there is also an
other causality, that of freedom.
Antithesis: There is no freedom; every thi.ng in the world takes
place solely in accordance with laws of nature.
4. Thesis: There belongs to the v;orld, either as its past or as
its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary -
Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the
world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.
Thus Kant exhibits in systematic form the famous contradictions into
which, as he notes, reason precipitates itself v/hen it asks m.etaphysical
questions .
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Ir. Kant's discussion of dogmatism and empiricism, he sides with
empiricism, but he does not commit himself. In his view empiricism,
though sound in its negative criticism of speculative metaphysics, is
itself a dogmatic system which dogmatically limits reality to phenomena
and thus treats them as though they were things-in-themselves. Thus,
while accepting the empiricist criticism of metaphysical argument, one
must rise above the narrow limits of dogmatic empiricism and leave room
for noumenal reality. Metaphysics is itself sustained by moral and re
ligious interests. One must acknowledge that metapnysics represents
levels of human life which are not catered to by sheer empiricism. In
the critical philosophy, Kant maintains that both the fallacies of meta
physics and the dogmatic materialism and mechanism of sheer empiricism
can be avoided. Antinomies can be risen above by limiting knowledge
to its proper sphere at the same time room is left for practical faith
based on moral experience. Human freedom cannot be admitted within the
phenomenal sphere; but it may be a reality, and later on it turns out to
be a necessary postulate of the moral consciousness.
Reason is at variance with itself; hence, a solution is needed. In
Kant's opinion, the only v/ay to avoid these antinomies is to accept his
own (critical) fK>int of view and recognize that the world which is the
obiect of knowledge is a world of appearances existing only insofar as
it is constructed. This solution enables one to dismiss both parties
to the dispute in the case of the first two antinomies, and to accept
the contentions of both parties in the case of the other two.
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Ideal of Pure Reason
In the course of the history of Christian thought many theologians
have felt obliged to give reasons for believing that God exists. These
theologians try to take up the task of providing evidences to prove that
it is more intelligent to believe than to disbelieve God's existence,
evidences which are the so-called theistic proofs for the existence of
God. Many difficulties have infected this whole subject because of the
ambiguous meaning of the word proof . This whole task started from Plato
and went on until the time of Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and Descartes, v/ho
undertook to prove God's existence ontologically . cosmologically , and
teleologically. Immanuel Kant then came to the stage and- delivered his
well-known refutation of these familiar arguments for the existence of
God in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant largely succeeded in denying that a supremely Perfect Being can
be demonstrated by rational proof alone. He called these arguments spec
ulative arguments . Kant claimed that speculative metaphysics topples
into illusion when it tries to deduce the existence of a Being as First
Cause i.'eyond the world from the empirical claim of causes within the
world. Knowledge of the world cannot be used to give an account of the
nature of a Being who lies outside the region of this knowledge of the
world. He held that a necessary first cause cannot be inferred from any
regress of known causes.
Ontological Proof
From I.mrnanuel Kant, the Ontological argument that a perfect being
ir.ust also be an existing being, God necessarily exists, received careful
scrutiny and its most devastating blow. Kant recognized that the argu-
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inent possesses great weight and authority, and that he himself accorded
respect to it while thinking that is was objectively inadequate. The
concept of an absolutely necessary being is a concept of pure reason, a
mere idea, the objective reality of v;hich is very far from being proved
by the fact that reason requires it. The idea serves rather to lim.it
the understanding than to extend ic to new objects, because it instructs
only in rega.rd to a certain unattainable completeness.
Men have been speaking of an absolutely necessary being in all
ages but have not endeavored to understand whether and hov/ a thing of
this kind allows even being thought. The verbal definition of the con
cept that it is something the non-existence of which is impossible,
yields no insight into the conditions which make it necessary to regard
the non-existence of a thing as absolutely unthinkable. One needs to
know these conditions to detei-mine whether or not, in resorting to this
concept, he is thinking anything at all. The task of removing all those
conditions which the understanding indispensably requires in order to
regard something as necessary is very far from sufficient to show wheth
er one is still thinking anything in the concept of the unconditionally
necessary or perhaps rather nothing at all.
Kant points out two defects of this argument. The first is appli
cable to the form which Anselm had given which appeared self-contradic
tory to deny the existence of God. According to Kant, this concept was
ventured upon blindly and "has been supposed to have its meaning exhib
ited in a nunxber of examples; and on this account all further enquiry
66
into the inte.^ligi.bility has seemed to be quite needless. All
Critique of Pure Reason,, p. 501.
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the alleged examples in this argument are taken from judgments, not from
things and their existence. The unconditioned necessity of judgments is
not the same as an absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity
of the judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the
predicate in judgment. Kant used his famous geometrical propostion as
an example to substantiate the point he made here. He said that a tri
angle has three angles, does not declare that three angles are absolutely
necesary. but that, under the condition that there is a triangle, three
angles will necessarily be found in it. To suppose the existence of
a triangle and not that of its three angles is self-contradictory . If
there is nothing at all, then there is no contradiction, but to suppose
the non-existence of both a triangle and three angles is perfectly admis
sible. If, in an identical proposition, one rejects the predicate while
retaining the subject, contradiction results, but if both the subject
and predicate are rejected, there is nothing left to be contradicted.
It is the same with the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If
its existence is rejected, the thing itself v/ith all its predicates is
rejected, and no question of contradiction would arise. There is nothing
outside it that would be concradicted since the necessity of the thing
is not supposed to be derived from anything external, nor is there any
thing internal that would be contradicted, siiiCe in rejecting the thing
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itself, at the same time all its internal properties have been rejected.
"'God is ominpotent' is a necessary Judgement, The Omnipotence cannot
Ibid., p, 502.
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be rejected if we posit a Deity, that is, one infinite Being; for the
68
two concepts are identical." If one says, there is no God, neither
the Omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given. These are
all rejected together with its subject, and there is therefore not the
least consideration in such a judgment. It is clear from this then,
that if the predicate of a judgment is rejected with its subject there
is no internal contradiction. Kant himself went on to say that there
are subjects which cannot be removed, and must always remain. This could
be a way of saying that there are absolutely necessary subject, but he
said that it is based on assumption and it is the impossibility which he
has undertaken to prove. This he said because one cannot form the least
concept of a thing which leaves behind a contradiction when it is re
jected with all its predicates, and in the absence of contradiction one
has no criterion of impossibility through a priori concepts alone. If
one admits God, his existence must be affirmed; if one declines to ac
cept God, nothing can compel him to admit God's existence.
The second objection which Kant made applies more to the form in
which he knew the argument as it came from the hands of Christian Wolff,
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a philosopher who antedates Kant by half a century, Wolff conceived
existence to be a p^redicate like other predicates, and thought that to
have existence is to have another predicate added to others already pos
sessed. Anything perfect cannor lack this predicate any m.ore than it
can lack any other; and that, therefore, the most real being must hava
existence am.ong the perfections predicable of it. Kant's criticism of
Ibid.
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Kant's criticism-of this is that existence is not a predicate. "Being
is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of some
thing which could be added to the concept of a thing. "^� He said that
this is just the positing of a thing as existing in itself. It is merely
a verb linking to a subject of a judgment. To say, "God is Omnipotent"
involves two entities, is relating God and omnipotent as subject and
predicate. But to say God is adds no new predicate, but only posits the
subject with all its predicates. Kant illustrated this by reiterating
his point, "the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real
thalers contain no more than a possible hundred thalers. . . . Exist
ence does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred tha-
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lers." The object as it exists is added to the concept synthetically.
From the above concept, Kant said that when he thought of a being
as the Supreirie reality, there was still the question of whether it ex
isted. Though nothing may be lacking, in one's concept of the possible
real content of a thing in general , something is still lacking in rela
tion to the whole state of thought, which that knowledge of this object
is also possible a posteriori. If an object of the senses is being dealt
with, the existence of the thing could not be confounded ivith the mere
concept of it.
Whatever and however much one's concept of an object may contain,
one must go outside it if existence is ascribed to the object. In deal
ing with the objects of pure thought, there are no means whatsoever of
k.nowing their existence since it would have to be known in a completely
Op. cit., p. 504. Ibid. , p. 505.
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a priori manner. Consciousness of all existence belongs exclusively to
the unity of experience; any existence outside this field, while not
indeed such as can be declared to be absolutely impossible, is of the
nature of an assumption which one can never be in a position to justify,
Kant then made this observation by saying.
The concept of a Supreme Being is in many aspects a very use
ful idea; but just because it is a m.ere idea, it is altogether
incapable, by itself alone, of enlarging our knowledge in re
gard to what exists. It is not even competent to enlighten us
as to the possibility/ of any existence beyond that which is
known in experience,
The attempt to establish the existence of a Supreme Being by means of
the famous ontological argument of Descartes therefore is merely so much
labor and effort lost, "We can no longer extend our stock of insight by
mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few
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noughts to his cash account , "
It appears therefore, that according to Kant, if one said "God does
not exist," then "nothing outside" the concept of God would "be contra
dicted," It could be that he means, "God does not exist" cannot contra
dict "God exists." But "God does not exist" and "God exists" do seem to
contradict each other. If Kant thinks that God need not exist since
the notion of a necessary being would have to be contradicted by some
object outside it, then it is difficult to make sense of his proposal.
Normally propositions contradict each other. He would not be saying
anything of great philosophical importance if he said that people contra
dict the view that there is a necessary being.
Ibid., p. 506. Ibid., p. 507.
Kant's second objection seems to be that when one Says that some
thing exists, some quality.- attribute, or characteristic is not being
ascribed to it. This suggestion is true or correct, because to say that
something exists is always to say that some concept or description is
exem.plif ied. Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) put this point by saying that
"existence is a second-order predicate. When one is dealing with a first-
order predicate, one is dealing with a term that tells one something
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about the nature of something."
Cosmological Proof
The cosmological argument works back to a supreme cause of the ex
istence of the world as a whole. The argument says that we can move
from the bare fact that the world exists to the position that God is
its ultimate cause�First Cause. If anything exists, there must exist
an absolutely necessary Being also. This proof begins with experience,
and it is not entirely a priori. The necessary being can be determined
completely by its own concept. There is only one concept of a thing
possible which a priori completely determines it, and that is the su
premely Perfect Being, and it is by this concept alone which a necessary
Being can be thought of. Therefore, it is concluded that a highest
Being exists by necessity -
The cosmological argument demonstrates that God must exist, but
such a comme.ndation of God's existence has a less stunning effect and
a more persuasive influence. Apologetically, its aim is more limited
than the ontological argr.ment which attempts to show that Go<d's non-
Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 33.
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existence is unthinkable. The cosmological argument as presented by
Thomas Aquinas is in two forms based respectively upon the causal prin
ciple and logical implication. In its causal principle the argument
simply says that every being must have a cause, and by going back along
the causal chain far enough, a first cause is reached. This argument
is not evident in that the question goes: Why should not the chain of
causes be continued indefinitely without ever ending in a first member
of the chain? It is this inability to help reach a first cause infal
libly that is pressed home by Immanuel Kant. Immanuel Kant took over
the criticism from. David Hume and carried it further. David Hume, a
skeptic, said that all knowledge arises from impressions given in exper
ience, and declared that knowledge is nothing more than a succession of
impressions. He ended by saying that causation is nothing more than
a mental association; and it is not somiething behind received impres
sion, but the expectation aroused by unvarying succession of certain
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impressions. It follows then that causation rightly understood can be
only of impressions and cannot lead beyond them. This makes it impos
sible to talk of a first cause of the world, for the world is not an
impression arising out of experience. Hume could not understand and
believe it because he was a skeptic. Kant carried it further, but he
did not deny the existence of the suprasensible , he only denied having
knowledge of it.
Kant proceeded with his refutation of this proof. He said that
this proof takes its stand on experience and pretended to be different
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from the ontological proof v/hich places its v/hole confidence in pure
concepts� a priori only . The cosmological argument uses that experience
only in order to make one step to the existence of a necessary Being in
general. The properties that this Being may have can never be learned
76
from the empirical argument, and for that purpose reason takes leave
of it altogether and tries to find out what properties an absolutely
necessary Being ought to possess. This requisite is believed by reason
to exist in the concept of a supremely perfect Being only, and reason
concludes at once that this must be the necessary Being. It is there
fore assumed that the concept of the highest reality is perfectly ade
quate to the concept of absolute necessity in existence. This is tlie
same proposition in the ontological argument because that absolute ne
cessity is an existence from mere concepts. Kant said:
The whole conclusive strength of the so-called cosmologi
cal proof rests therefore in reality on the ontological proof
from mere concepts, while the appeal to experience is quite
superfluous, and though it may lead us on to the concept of
absolute necessity, it cannot demonstrate it with any definite
object.
As soon as this is tried, all experience must be abandoned and an effort
made to find out which among the pure concepts may contain the condi
tions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary Being. Kant further
said that this proof is not only as illusory as the ontological proof
78 . .
but has also committed, in addition, an ignoratio elenchi by promising
to lead by a new path but after a short circuit bringing one back to the
old v/ay of speculation.
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The criticisms of the cosmological argument therefore are firstly,
that of the transcendental principle of inferring a cause from the ac
cidental. The principle that everything contingent must have a cause is
valid in the world of the sensible (phenomenal world) only, and has not
a meaning outside it. The thing is that either the first cause one
speaks of belongs to the phenomenal world, in which case the principle
will carry one to the so-called first cause, or it exists outside the
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phenomenal world (noumenal world) . Secondly, the causal series is
the one which cannot be properly prematurely completed. As Kant sug
gests, "We cannot take this cab so far, and having reached a point in
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the journey which happens to suit us simply dismiss it." Thirdly,
Kant said that this is false self-satisfaction of reason with regard
to the completion of the senses. This is because it is brought about by
removing in the end every kind of condition, without which no concept of
necessity is possible, and when any definite concepts have become impos
sible, it is accepted as completion of the concept.
It may be allowable to admit the existence of a Being entirely suf
ficient to serve as the cause of all possible effects, simply in order
to assist reason in her search for unity of causes, but to go as far
as to say that such a Being exists necessarily is no longer a modest
language of an admissible hypothesis, for the knowledge of that which is
absolutely necessary must itself possess absolute necessity.
Immanuel Kant said, in a nutshell, that the law of causality or the
contingency argument belongs to the finite, phenomenal world. It seems
79 80 ,
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as if he contradicted himself with his Transcendental Logic which said
that we are compelled to infer reality from the appearance or the nou
mena] from the phenomenal, or the infinite from the finite. He said,
the understanding, therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the exist
ence of things in themselves also; and to this extent we may say that
the representation of such things as are the basis of appearances, con
sequently of mere beings or the understanding, is not only admissible
but unavoidable. By this then, he has affirmed that the lav; of cause
and effect does not rem.ain within the phenomenal world alone but even
the noumenal. He even said, "There is indeed something seductive in
our pure concepts of the understanding which tempts us to a transcendent
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use�a use which transcends all possible experience." For something
to be unavoidable and tempting, it must exist. There should be no di
chotomy between the two worlds as Kant proposes; instead there should be
a continuum.
Teleological Proof
As for the teleological argument, Kant regarded it as the oldest,
the clearest and the most in conformity with the common reason of human
ity, "concluding that it will always have authority even if it be strip-
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ped of its demonstrative certainty." This does not, however, prevent
him. from criticizing it anyway. As Jcnown to Kant, the start is vi/ith
the selection among natural things that manifest purposiveness or design
bu this arrangement must be ascribed to a sublim.e, wise and intelligent
81-
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cause other than the world itself because the materials are not native
to the world. Kant called this the physico-theological (teleological)
proof .
This present world presents an immeasurable stage of variety, order,
fitness, and beauty. Everywhere a chain of causes and effects, of means
and ends are seen, and all point to another thing as its cause. As that
cause necessitates the same further enquiry, the whole universe would be
lost in the abyss of nothingness unless we admitted something which,
existing by itself, original and independent outside the chain of infi
nite contingencies, should support it, and as the cause of its origin,
secure to it at the same time its permanence. As to causality, we can
not do without a last and highest Being. Kant said that we can do this
II
easily, though only in the faint outline of an abstract concept if we
represent to ourselves all possible perfections united in it as in one
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substance." Such a co.ncept would agree with the demand of our reason,
would have no contradictions in itself, would be favorable to the exten
sion of the employment of reason in the midst of experience by guiding
it toward order and system, and lastly, would never be decidedly opposed
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to any experience.
''
This proof is m.ost in conformity with human reason
It gives life to the study of nature and derives its own existence from it .
This proof reveals aims and intention, and enlarges one's knowledge
of nature by leading us toward ,that peculiar unity of the principle
which exists outside nature. This knowledge reacts again on its cause.
64 . .
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namely, the transcendental idea, and thus increases the belief in a su
preme Author to an irresistible conviction. It would therefore be ex
tremely sad and utterly vain to attempt to diminish the authority of that
proof. Reason cannot be discouraged by any doubts of subtle and abstract
speculation because as it is roused from every inquisitive indecision,
it soars from height to height until it reaches the highest; from the
conditioned to conditions until it reaches the supreme and unconditioned
Author of all.
According to Kant,
The physico-theological proof can never establish by itself
alone the existence of a Supreme Being, but must always leave
it to the ontological proof to supply its deficiency; so that,
after all, it is the ontological proof which contains the only
possible argument (supposing always that any speculative proof
is possible) , and human reason can never do without it.
^
Before going to give the impossibility of the teleological argument
8 7
he mentioned the fundamental principal points. Firstly, the proof has
to say that there are everywhere in the world clear indications of an
intentional arrangement carried out v/ith great wisdom. Secondly, the
fitness of this arrangement is entirely foreign to the things existing
in the v/orld and belongs to them contingently only . The nature of dif
ferent things have been arranged on purpose by a rational disposing prin
ciple so that they all cooperate toward definite goals. Thirdly, there
exists, therefore, a wise cause which must be the cause of the world by
means of an intelligence and by freedom. Fourthly, the unity of that
cause may be inferred with certainty from the unity of the reciprocal
Ibid., p. 521. Ibid.
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relation of the parts of the world with plausibility, according to the
principles of analogy (to human art) .
The main point of criticism by Immanuel Kant is that the proof can
"demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world v/hose efforts
are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but
not of a creator of the world to whom all things are subject. "^^ The
teleological argument is saying that the fitness and harmony existing in
so many works of nature might prove the contingency of the form, not of
matter-substance in the world. For the matter, it would be necessary
to prove, in addition, that the things of the world were in themselves
incapable of such order and harmony unless there existed the product of
a supreme wisdom. To prove the contingency of matter itself, there must
be recourse to a transcendental arguraent.
Another limitation drawn out by Kant is that the argument "enables
us to infer only a cause proportionate to the evidential effects, and
from a limited effect is possible to infer only a limited cause. Since
no one has the knowledge of the world in its infinity, inference from it
in this respect cannot be credited with perfection. The inference of
the parts of the world therefore, proceeds to the order and design that
can everywhere be observed to be the existence of a cause proportionate
to it. That cause must be a Being which possesses all might, wisdom, or
all perfection of an all-sufficient Being. Concerning the magnitude
of the perfection of a thing in general, there exists no definite con
cept except that which comprehends all possible perfection, and only the
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89all of reality is thoroughly determined in the concept. This is so
because those things that are magnified are only relative representa
tions which are observed. Hence, Kant said, "I hope that no one would
dare to comprehend the relation of that part of the world which he has
observed to omnipotence, the relation of the order of the world to the
highest wisdom, and the relation of the unity of the world to the abso-
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lute unity of its author. ..." The physico-teleological argument
can never give a definite concept of the highest cause of the world,
and it is insufficient, as a principle of theology, to form the basis of
religion.
Kant asserted that we can infer the existence of an Intelligent
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Deity, as we infer the existence of intelligence in our fellowmen �on
grounds not less reasonable. One's sense takes no cognizance of the
minds of other men. One perceives certain motions of their bodies.
The warrant for the contrary inference lies in the fact that, being pos
sessed of consciousness and acquainted with its effects on oneself, like
effects are regarded as evidence of the same principle in others. In
this inference one transcends the limit of sense and physical experiment
In truth, in admitting the reality of consciousness in oneself, a step
is taken which not physical observation can justify. As Sanday said,
"Where the brain is opened to view no microscope, were its power immeas-
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urably augmented, could discover the least trace of it."
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The step leading to absolute totality is impossible on the em.piri-
cal road, but is possible with physico-teleological. After having
reached the stage of admiration for the greatness, the wisdom, power of
the Author of the world and seeing no further advance possible, one
leaves the argum.ent carried on by empirical proofs, and lays hold of
that contingency which was implied from, the order and design of the
world from the very first. The next step then would be from the concept
of transcendental to the existence of something absolutely necessary;
then from, the concept of the first cause to its completely determined
93
concept of the all-embracing reality. The physico-teleological proof,
therefore, takes refuge in the cosmological proof, and as the only onto
logical proof in disguise, it really carried out its original intention
by means of pure reason only, though it professed to base everything on
clear proof from experience.
Admitting that the idea of design is essential to our comprehension
of the world, Kant raised the point that it may be subjective only, mere
94
regulative of our perceptions, but not objective or constitutive. Like
the idea of causation, he inquired whether it might not be a mere sup
position, a working hypothesis, which a deeper penetration of
Nature
might dispense with. He said that if we persuade ourselves that we can,
by means of the ideas, widen our knowledge transcendently ,
or far beyond
our experience, then we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in
our esti
mate of the proper role of reason and of its principles. Immanuel Kant
93
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forgot that the thought of design was not artificially originated by
individuals, but that it was a conviction which the objects of Nature
themselves suggested and brought home.
Comment on the Ideal of Pure Reason
Generally, Kant was seen as supporting the view that proving God
should not be attempted because God is the object of faith. To prove
God would be to do too much since it would make Him an object of knowl
edge rather than faith. Kant said, with satisfaction, that he had suc
ceeded in removing knowledge to make room for faith, but the type of
faith for which he made room is defined as rational faith. It is indeed
rational in that at the end it turns out to be simply knowledge of God
reached by a route other than the usual speculative proofs: cosmologi
cal, ontological, and teleological. Where these three fail Kant thought
that his moral argument succeeded. The objection to this proof is sup
posed to be that God is the object of faith, not knowledge which is oth
erwise called faith. What must be known is that there cannot be com
plete dichotomy between faith and knowledge because it would lead to
a kind of uncertainty. One needs faith and knowledge while on earth in
order to put one's relation to God and one's cognition of him on the
most dependent footing. The Bible does not go against our having cer
tain knowledge about God, or that we are unable to have certain knowl
edge of him. If God cannot be proved in the way appropriate to what
he is, then we have no right even to be in relationship to him, which is
called faith. We must have sufficient grounds for belief in God.
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Final Thought on God
In Kant's discussion, one of the general themes of the Dialectic
was that speculative metaphysics got into difficulties because it at
tempted to make claims about objects that are not of a possible experi
ence. In discussing the theme of God, Kant .mentioned:
The question under consideration is obviously synthetic, call
ing for an extension of our knowledge beyond all limits of ex
perience, namiely, to the existence of a being that is to cor
respond to a m.ere idea of ours, an idea that cannot be paral-
led in any experience.
He further reiterated by saying.
All synthetic principles of reason allov/ only of an immanent
employment; and in order to have knowledge of a supreme being
we should have to put them to a transcendent use, for which
our understanding is in no way fitted. If the empirically
valid law of causality is to lead to the original being, the
latter must belong to the chain of objects of experience, and
in that c^ge it would, like all appearances, be itself con
ditioned.
Thus to employ reason in theology, which is in the noumena, is bound
to be a fruitless effort and by their nature null and void, because it
will be in a merely speculative manner. The distinction between the
noumena and the phenomena is here reiterated in that the phenomena can
not penetrate the noumena at all. Human understanding cannot go beyond
the limits of experience, and as it is clearly stated above, experience
must be put to transcendent use to enable one to go beyond this imir'.anent
realm, for "transcendental questions allow only of transcendental an
swers, that is, answers exclusively based on concepr.� that are a priori.
Ibid., p. 529.
Ibid., p. 528.
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without the least empirical admixture." Thus all attempts to con
struct a theology through purely speculative reason, by means of a trans
cendental procedure, are without results.
Ibid., 529.
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Constitutive and Regulative Uses of Ideas of Pure Reason
Kant made a distinction between constitutive and regulative uses of
ideas of pure reason, and it was crucial in his philosophy- He showed
that the concepts under discussion, the ideas of pure reason, had no
constitutive use, that they could not possibly yield knowledge-claims
about Cartesian souls or the world as an absolute totality or God.
Knowledge required both concepts and intuitions and intuitions cannot.
be of these subjects. But these concepts have a regulative use, encour
aging to greater and more systematic scientific efforts, and it will
unify investigations in psychology, cosmology, and natural theology.
We shall,, first, in psychology, under the guidance of inner
experience, connect all the appearances, all the actions and
receptivity cf our mind, as if the mind were a simple substance
which persists with personal identity (in this life at least) ,
while its states, to which those of the body belong only as
outer conditions, are in continual change. Secondly, in cos
mology, we must follow up the conditions of both inner and
outer natural appearances, in an enquiry which is to be regard
ed as never allowing of completion, just as if the series of
appearances were in itself endless, without any first or su
preme member. We need not, in so doing, deny that, outside
all appearances, there are purely intelligible grounds of all
appearances; but as we have no knowledge of these whatsoever,
we must never attempt to make use of them in our explanations
of nature. Thirdly, and finally, in the domain of theology,
we must view everything that can belong to the context of
possible experience as if this experience formied an absolute
but at the same time completely dependent and sensibly con
ditioned unity, and yet also at the same time as if the sum of
all appearances (the sensible world itself) had a single,
highest and all-sufficient ground beyond ^i^tself, namely, a
self-subsistent , original, creative reason.
Regulative views of reason have no knowledge-yielding use, but
a
methodological use.^^ In Kanfs distinction between constitutive and
regulative uses of ideas of pure reason, he was claiming
that the ideas
Ibid., p. 551. Wilkerson, p.
155,
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of reason had no constitutive use and that they nonetheless had an im
portant regulative use, Kant's main emphasis was that though the real
ity was not known, one should act as i f there was something real. One
could not, even in principle, claim to know that there were Cartesian
souls, that the world was infinite, that there was a God, but nonethe
less it was important that one should act as if there were Cartesian
souls, as if the world was infinte, as if there was a God,
Chapter 4
ANALYSIS OF GOD, FREEDOM, AND IMMORTALITY
According to Kant, the doctrine of theology is logically dependent
on ethics. This he discussed in the Dialectic of the second Critique.
He said, "The only theology of reason which is possible is that which is
based on moral laws or seeks guidance from them.""'" One's theological
concepts are wholly parasitic on one's ethical concepts. God can be
understood only as a perfect moral agent. Thus ethics is prior to the
ology. There are postulates which are required by the demands of the
moral consciousness. These postulates of morality are three, namely,
God, freedom, and immortality. Moral ideals and aspirations will be
defeated by the universe without these postulates. The postulates are
so important that with them the moral law has meaning, and the possibil
ity of attaining the goal of m.oral striving is assured.
Kant saw quite clearly that in his own criterion of knowledge,
ethical and theological claims as traditionally understood could not
count as knowledge. The ideas of pure reason in which he was interested
were threate.ned.
Even tiie assumption as made on behalf of the necessary practi
cal employm.ent of my reason of God, freedo.m, and immortality
is not permissible unless at the same time speculative reason
be deprived of its pretensions to transcendental insight. For
in order to arrive at such insights it m.ust m.ake use of prin
ciples which, in fact, extend only to objects of possible
experience and which, if also applied to what cannot be an
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, t.rans., Lewis White
Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 212.
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object of experience, always really change this into an appear
ance, thus rendering all practical extension of pure reason
impossible. l have, therefore, found it necessary to deny
knowledge in order to make room for faith.'"
God as a Postulate of Practical Reason
Immanuel Kant started his postulate of God as a practical reason
from moral law. Moral law leads to a practical problem which is pre
sented by pure reason alone, without the aid of any sensible motives.
A moral agent, for Kant, does not mean that a man must insulate
himself in his own personal conscience with no heed to the moral signif
icance of the world around him. The moral agent needs a m.oral universe
in which to perfect all aspects of life, to do justice to his inclina
tions as well as his reason. In order to perfect these aspects of life,
it can only come about in a v/orld embodying the highest good, which
matches happiness with virtue. If we could not conceive of this highest
good, then "the moral law which commands that it be furthered must be
fantastic, directed to empty imaginary ends, and consequently inherently
3
false." The impetus of the moral law is to bring one's maxims under
the discipline of reason. (That is the moral principle that one adopts
for oneself as distinct from a law which is valued for everyone) . One
needs to anticipate some tangible satisfaction in his own moral efforts;
if not the efforts would seem devoid of lasting meaning. The world in
which we might e.xpect rewards for our moral labors seems to elude our
grasp, and this is because ws perceive no innate necessity that our indi-
Critique of Pure Reason , p . 29.
^
Ibid. , p. 118.
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vidual moral actions will lead to a moral system of nature. The links
we may be able to di aw between the causality of the will and a variety
of concrete effects lies predominantly in the realm of possibility. One
may continually do what he knows is right but has no guarantee from the
actions themselves that they will cause other persons to do the right
thing or even for the universe to treat him as fairly as he thinks is
proper. As Kant said,
. . . the acting rational being in the world is not at the
same time the cause of the v/orld and of nature itself. Hence,
there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a neces
sary connection between the morality and proportionate happi
ness of a being which belongs to a world as one of its parts
and as thus dependent on it. Not being nature's cause, )iis
will cannot by its own strength bring nature, as it toucheSj.on
happiness, into complete harmony with practical principles."
The moral law does not of itself promise happiness. "Happiness is a
condition of a rational being in the world with v/hom everything goes ac
cording to his wish and will; it rests therefore on the harmony of physi
cal nature with his whole end, and likewise with the essential determin-
ing principle of his will." The acting rational being with the world
is not the cause of the v?orld and nature itself. This makes it diffi
cult to have the ground in the moral law for a necessary connection be-
tv/een morality and happiness in a being that belongs to the v/orld as
a part of it and dependent on it, for he cannot by his will be a cause
of this nature nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonize with
his practical principles. In such a problem of pure reason, such a con-
^
Carl A. Raschke, Moral Action, God, and History in the Thought of
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nectxon of harmony between morality and happiness is postulated as nec
essary. Also, "the existence of a cause of the whole of all nature
which is distinct from nature itself and contains this principle of con
nection, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness v/ith morality must
oe postulated." This must be a supreme cause and must contain the p/rin-
ciple of harmony of nature with a law of the will of rational beings and
the conception of this law with their morality as their motive with
their moral character. This morality and happiness is possible in the
v/orld only on the supposition of a supreme Being having a causality cor
responding to moral character. This being that is capable of acting
on the conception of laws is an intelligence, and the causality of such
a being is his will; therefore, the supreme cause of nature which must
be presupposed as a. condition of the real Being is the one who is the
cause of nature by intelligence and will� its author is God. It follows
that the postulate of the possibility of the highest desired good is
likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original good; that
is of the existence of God. It is now a necessity to promote the real
being which means that it is morally necessary to assume the existence
of God.
Kant said, "A need of pure reason in its speculative use leads only
g
to hypotheses, that of pure reason, to postulate." Hypotheses supply
an ultimate ground for organizing a system of empirical cognitions. A
hypothesis serves completely to satisfy ray inquiring reason with respect
to the cognitions e.nd it can only attain a degree of probability. It
Ibid., p. 223. Ibid.
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does not lay adequate grounds of certainty for moral action. It is just
a presupposition which cannot be brought to a higher degree of certainty
and it points only to a likelihood that something is true. A postulate
furnishes a definite rational being with which one should behave or
think in a particular fashion. A postulate is belief or presupposition
which one knov/s must be true if certain rules of life are applied. It
fixes the conditions for putting the rules in effect. It establishes
the possibility of following a whole series of rules which, it is known,
will achieve the desired result within the , context prescribed -
Moral postulates tailor such assumptions to m.aking the rules of
practical living viable. The necessity of a practical postulate has to
do with the fact that it is indispensable as a standpoint for moral ac
tion. It gives semblance of objective reality to an idea (such as God)
which cannot be confirmed or denied by the usual empirical criteria.
A practical postulate intends to convince that the universe exists in
such a way that takes consideration for moral intentions. That God is a
practical postulate .T.eans, "whenever we behave morally, we must at the
9
same time think of God as real to us in some manner of speaking."
The necessity with which one thinks of God mirrors the necessity
with which we feel obliged to obey the moral law; whereas moral obliga
tion is a fact of reason that represents itself a priori to human con
science. God's existence is a necessary belief that makes possible the
discharge of that obligation from reflection on v;hat is required to be a
moral agent in a concrete sense.
"""^
It has been seen that the need to
Raschke. p. 97. Ibid., p> 98.
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think occurs with the recognition that happiness does not accrue to vir
tue, even though "it is not impossible that the morality cf intention
should have a necessary relation as cause to happiness as an effect in a
sensuous world. , . ."^^ The practical possibility of a relation be
tween happiness and virtue disappears when we postulate God because the
12
relation is indirect, mediated by an intelligible Author of nature. .
Kant added, therefore, that the highest good is possible in the world
only on the supposition of a supreme cause of nature which has a causal
ity correspondeing to the moral intentions.
God is a postulate of practical reason because he is as vital to
the consistency of our moral reasoning as any assumption in a geometri
cal proof. Kant said.
So far as morality is based on the conception of man as a
free agent, who, just because he is free bind himself through
his reason to unconditioned laws, it stands in need neither of
the idea of another Being over him, for him to apprehend his
duty, nor of an incentive other than the law itself for him to
13
do his duty.
For Kant, the moral agent wanted a world in which happiness and the
pure will exist alongside each other. The concept of this world is the
highest good the absence of which would be a hindrance to moral decision.
But for the highest good to come true, we must postulate a higher moral,
most holy, and omnipotent Being, which alone can unite the two elements
of the highest good. The act of postulating God as guarantor of the
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 228.
^2
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highest good is an act of faith, more precisely a rational faith. It
is a rational faith because pure reason alone is the source from which
it springs. Rational faith yields a knowledge of God in a practical
sense. The knowledge of God gained in rational faith serves to keep
reasoning about the moral life internally consistent so that one does
not have to choose between two irreconcilable contradictions in moral
experience while, in the same breath, remaining certain that one's knowl-
14
edge is true. For Kant, farth in God is an "absolute presupposition"
of the moral life. An absolute presupposition cannot be verified be
cause a presupposition is set out in advance of a process of inference.
The act of presupposing God as a starting point for moral reasoning
about the consequences of action constitute an act of faith which is
a subjective trust in one another, that one will keep his promise to the
15
other. "Speaking by way of analogy, the practical reason is, as it
were, the promiser , man is the promisee, and the good expected from the
1 6
act is the promissum.
" In this faith is a kind of iron-bound pact be
tween God, who is postulated, and man. God is obliged to give man
the moral universe on the condition that he follows the m.oral law. In
the light of this pact, "morality leads to religion, through which it
extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of
mankind, for whose will that is the final end which at the same
time
can and ought to be man's final end.""""^ To postulate God means to
assume a superior will, of which ours is a mere shadow, that
can
RaschJ<:e, p. 102, Ibid., p. 103.
Ibid. Kant, Selections, pp. 5-6.
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fill in for defirinecLes. God, in short, is the perfect moral agent.
Gck3 as Supreme Will
In Kant's first Critique, he denoted God as "Supreme will which
18taKes into itself or under itself all private wills," God is the su
preme will because his will is the vehicle for realizing the moral uni
verse a "system of self -compensating m.orality in wnich everyone does
19
v.'hat he should." He stipulated the reason one must believe in the
existence of such a will when he said,
if we consider from the standpoint of view of moral
unity as a necessary law of the world the cause which alone
can produce the suitable effect and thus give this law obliga
tory force, there must be a single Supreme Will which takes
these laws into itself. For how would we among different will
find a complete unity of purposes? This Will must be omnipo
tent so that all nature ma-^^be subject to it in reference to
the morality of the world.
It is the omnipotence of this supreme will which remedies the impotence
of the finite wills in their efforts to make nature comply with moraiiry
The absence of the concept of the divine will would make the ideal of
the highest good evaporate. This is because if the highest good can
have practical reality, it must be attainable by some agent, and human
agents lack the potency to attain it. The incapability of man in reach
ing the highest good is due to the recalcitrance of nature and the pres
ence of radical evil in the maxims of men. The immoral acts of men re
sult in a state of injustice which blocks the proportioning of virtue to
happiness. This defect in man's will cannot be said to represent the
limits of willing if the moral law as a counsel of rational perfection
18 19 20
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is to make sense. It must be possible to conceive of a will which is
not subject to the limitations man discerns in himself ^ hence Kant comes
up with the idea of a divine will containing a moral capacity that man
naively lacks, who must be God, the holy will, A holy will is "com.plete
21
fitness of the will to the moral law," This idea of holiness (holy
will) can never be fully reached by any creature. The emblem of this
holy will is that it needs no constraints to morality, hence for the
divine in general, there are no imperatives. I ought is out of place
here because I will is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the
law. It also needs no incentives to action. By incentives, Kant meant,
" subjective determining ground of a will whose reason does not by its
22
nature necessarily conform to objective law." A divine will inher
ently, and without force of obligation, act according to moral prin
ciples. In consequence then, no incentives can be absolutely attributed
to the divine will.
The Divine will embodies what men's v;ills lack, yet men cannot
attribute any reality in itself to this will. The reality which this
will has is only for the moral consciousness. As far as Kant was con
cerned, language about God divorced from the language of morals is mean
ingless. God has a will but his willing is always equivalent to what
man cannot morally will. The inadequacies of man's will specify the
circumstances in which God must be believed to exist,
Man's will m it
self can never achieve all that it intends, but one must believe God's V7ill
21
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can. Man's will is corrupted, inconstant, unholy, but God's is holy.
God's will encapsulates what man's will would be if it were all that the
moral ideals of virtue and the highest good urge that it should be.
To think of the divine will is "to think of our morally necessary pur
poses as at the same time his purposes.
"^^
Purpose is what we aim at
in all our acts of will.
God as Moral Purposer
Kant analyzed the necessity to talk about God as a being with the
moral universe as his purpose in his ".Methodology of the Teleological
Judgement" of his third critique. The language about God as moral pur
poser grows out of the need of practical reason to view nature somehow
as harmonizing with moral ends. In this critique, Kant argued that
physical or natural theology can only "infer the supreme cause of nature
24
and Its purpose from, purposes of nature which can be empirically known."
Its "date, and so the principles, for determining that concept of an
intelligent world causes are merely empirical and do not enable us to
infer any of the properties beyond those which experience reveals in its
25
effects." Hence, its "purposive reference therein is and must be al
ways considered only as conditioned in nature and it consequently cannot
26
inquire into the purpose for which nature itself exists." Moral the
ology can adduce to this for it infers that purposive cause and its
23
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properties from the moral purposes of rational beings in nature which
can be known a priori. Moral theology alone discloses the "final pur
pose of creation which is inaccessible to natural theology, the moral
27
universe, or man under moral laws." Moral theology teaches that na
ture must appear to be morally designed if we want to think of it as de
signed. The acknowledgement of man's moral purposiveness leads to the
conception of a cause with a sim.iJar, though perfect, purpose for the
world. If there v/ere no higher purpose consonant with the moral law,
our own moral purposing would come to nought.
Kant argued, then, that moral reason presupjjosed a cause that is
capable of representing purposes to itself, and consequently was an in
telligent Being, it must be thought as acting in accordance with the
laws of 3uc"n a Being. Such a purposeful cause of events resided in man's
will. In order for this moral will to effect what it intends, there
must be an all-sufficient purposive cause to mediate the efficacy; if
not it would be impossible.
This is tihe arguraent which Kant called the moral proof of God's
existence, and by proof he meant a metaphysical demonstration combining
both a rx3steriori and a priori premises. Proof for Kant, consisted in
any method of reasoning that reached certainty. "The moral ground of
the existence of God, properly speaking, does not merely com.plete and
render perfect the physico-teleological proof, but it is a special proof
�29
that supplies the conviction which is wanting in the latter." The
Ibid., p. 296.
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proof has little to do with the philosophical proofs for God's existence,
hence it is a special one. The moral proof does not demonstrate God's
existence per se, for our knowledge of existence, Kant showed in his
refutation of the Ontological Argument, "belongs entirely to the domain
of experience, "
�
and since experience cannot divulge what lies beyond
experience (first cause), we cannot prove God's existence as glibly as
we can confirm the existence of objects in the empirical world. The
moral proof only proves that one must believe in God's existence, and
supplies the conviction absent in the physico-teleological proof because
from it we see why one must ascribe a reality to what is perceived as
purposiveness in nature. This purposiveness has meaning only as moral
purposiveness, and one cannot impute reality to it as long as one is
bent on immediately proving the proposition "God exists," instead of
the qualified construction, "If there is to be morality, God must be
31
real." The existence of a supreme moral purpose is not proved di
rectly, but in order to act morally one must somehow think of such an
existence. Kant never insisted that an attempt to verify God's exist
ence be made, but he argued that the existence of God be assumed ("as
if"). To argue for the necessity of m.aking an assumption is different
from arguing for the truth of what is not assumed. Kant's argument was
in this fashion; for example, "God exists, therefore, the m.oral universe
is possible." The assumption here is that God exists. Kant was here
arguing for two things: First, that the moral universe is possible, and
second, that if the moral universe is possible the first premise or
30 31
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assumption must be the existence of God. This argument, therefore, is
based on assumption� "as if."
God as a Person
Kant defined personality as "the freedom and independence from the
mechanism of nature regarded as a capacity of a being which is subject
to special laws (pure practical laws given by his own reason). "^^ Man,
as a person, that is as the subject of a morally practical reason, is
exalted above all prizes, for as such a one he is not to be valued mere
ly as a means to the ends of other people or even to his own ends, but
is to be prized as an end in himself. In Kant's words.
Moral personality ... is nothing but the freedom, of
a rational being under moral laws where as psychological per
sonality is merely the capacity to be conscious of the iden
tity of one's self in the various conditions of one's exist
ence. Hence it follows that a person is subject to nc laws
other than those he (either alone is at least jointly with
others) gives to himself.
In the act of relf-legislation, a person reckons responsibility for what
he does and thus affirms his own autonomy- If he did not own to respon
sibility for the act, the act would not be properly his own. Duty to
oneself as a person necessarily involves duty to a universe of persons.
Duty to all persons, including oneself, gives concrete meaning to the
demand of the moral law of acting (for the sake of duty) .
Kant explained the concept of a person in terms of the internal
sense of duty and the capacity to impute the m.oral law to oneself, to
32
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subject oneself to its constraints and judge oneself as responsible for
breaking these constraints. Consciousness of the internal court of just
ice within man is entitled conscience. Conscience lies innate in every
man; it binds every agent through a sense of duty to the moral law he
has fashioned for himself. It confirms what Kant called man's duty to
himself. He, on the other hand, advised that duty to oneself as a per
son was impossible without a committed duty to another person.
This original intellectual and moral predisposition called
conscience has the peculiarity that though this v;hole matter
is an affair of man with himself, man sees himself, neverthe
less, compelled to conduct this affair as though at the bid
ding of another person.-^'*
Therefore, as far as all man's duties are concerned, his conscience will
have to suppose someone other than himself to be the judge of his ac
tions, if his conscience is not to contradict itself. The court of con
science exists because the motive of respect for other persons is not a
habit of the will for finite rational agents. Conscience taken as a
sense of duty to a real person or other v;ho, by judging our motives and
deeds, restrains our own self-interest to the interest in mankind is
an end in itself. It reflects a possible scheme of moral obligations
which one member of a community may express toward other members who
know him and have definite influence over his activity. Real persons
are easily given to moral perversity that thwarts the realization of the
moral law in society; hence they cannot be the m.odel for the judge of
conscience because, as finite beings, they are incapable of knowing the
true intentions of men. The other is an ideal one which reason creates
Ibid., 157.
so
itself. This ideal person presiding over men's conscience who must
Ije a searcher of hearts for the court of justice, is set up m persons'
inmost selves; and he, at the same time, must be all-obliging. He m.ust
be or conceived as a person in relation to whom duties are to be re
garded as commanded by him because conscience is the internal judge of
all free actions. The ideal person commands a genuine sense of duty.
and he must possess all authority, for ottierwise he could not give prop^
er effect to his laws. This moral being possessing power over all is
35
called God. Conscience must then be conceived as the subjective prin
ciple o.f being accountable to God for one's deeds.
Man's capacity as a self-legislating person is diminished by his
own imperfections and because of these, man requires a conscience to
reprove him for his shortcomings and to inspire him. to right living.
This reproof and correction must have its source in a person other than
the man of conscience himself, and he must not correspond to any empiri
cal person and must not have im.perfections . The m.oral agent must have a
supreme person witn the keenest faculty to scrutinize and judge his in
tentions. The supreme person must be thought to have incorporated the
moral law into his v;ill sufficienly and to have perfected his autonomy
as a person. God's autonomy therefore, is necessary to be an independ
ent and righteous judge of other persons. Kant called this ideal Other,
God. The possibility of human autonomy, therefore presupposes God's
Ibid., p. 159.
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autonomy (theonomy) which is really nothing m.ore than man's autonomy
without blemish or defect.
Theonomy is, however, only an idea. The idea of a supreme person
to whom one is made accountable in conscience is given "only subjec
tivity by practical reason. ""^^ In this respect, duty to such a being is
not equal to the duty to men (real beings) - A duty to God is essen
tially "a duty regarding that which lies completely beyond the limits of
our experience, and is not to be met v/ithin our ideas, yet the idea of a
duty to God is not the consciousness of a duty to God.""^' A duty cannot
be exercised to a being existing only in thought. From this injunction,
therefore, Kant denied that man can enjoy a real personal relationship
v/ith God. God's personality and autonomy are not real objects of duty
in the sense that the personality and autonomy of neighbors are.
In a practical sense, according to Kant, "to have religion," or an
awareness of duty to God, "can be asserted to be a duty of man to him-
38
self." With the concept of God to whom one feels duty bound, "We do
not hereby have before us a given being to whom we are obligated; for
the actuality of such a being would first have to be proved (disclosed
39
by experience)." Duty to God, then, is essentially a kind of duty to
oneself. It is a duty to man's genuinely autonomy self -imprisoned in
the perversity and contradiction of his conventional self. Man's duty
to God signifies a relationship of the agent to a reflexive relationship
to one's own intentions to become an autonomous agent, to become like
3fi 37^ Ibid., p. 160.
"
Ibid., p. 161.
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God. 'riiis intentional self is what one intends or thinks he ought to
become, and it functions as an other. It di.sciplines and exhorts the
everyday self to progress in virtue and become a genuinely autonomous
self. The idea of God as person thus serves to devoicp in man the con
sciousness of hi.m.self as a person.
Freedom as a Postulate of Practical Reason
In Kant's Foundation of Metaphysics of Morality, he introduced the
concept of categorical imperatives and hyrvotheticaj. imperatives. The
categorical imperative states that all rational beings (who can be sub
ject to an imperative at all) ought to act in a certain way- They ought
to act only on those maxims which they can at the same time will, with
out contradiction, be universal laws. The categorical imperative thus
states an obligation, but it is a synthetic a priori proposition. The
imperative is not an analytic proposition because it cannot be obtained
by mere analysis of the concept of a rational will. Its predicate must
be connected necessarily with the subject. Unlike the hypothetical im
perative, the categorical imperative is unconditioned and it obliges the
will to act in a certain way. "It is, indeed, a practical synthetic
a priori proposition."' This means that it does not extend theoretical
knowledge of objects. It is directed only towards action, towards the
performance of actions good in themselves, but not towards knowledge
of empirical reality. This proposition is both a priori , independent of
all desires and inclinations, and synthetic. The question then arises
Copel '-.CP , p . 124 .
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as to how the practical synthetic a priori proposition is possible.
This is to ask what unites the subject and the predicate or what makes
possible a necessary connection between them.
What unites them cannot be anything in the sensible world. We can
not establish the possibility of a categorical imperative by referring
to anything in the causal series of phenomena. Physical necessity would
only give heteronomy, whereas what one is looking for is that which
m,akes possible the principle of autonomy. Kant found it in the idea
of freedom. What Kant did was to look for the necessary condition of
the possibility of obligation and of acting for the sake of duty alone,
in accordance with a categorical imperative, and he found this necessary
condition in the idea of freedom.
According to Kant, freedom could not be proved. It is perhaps more
accurate to say that the condition of the possibility of a categorical
imperative is to be found in the idea of freedom. This is not to say
that the idea of freedom is a mere fiction in any ordinary sense. In
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant showed that freedom is a negative pos
sibility in the sense that the idea of freedom does not involve a logi
cal contradiction, and also that one cannot act morally, for the sake of
duty, e-xcept under the idea of freedom. Obligation, ought, implies free
dom, freedom to obey or disobey the law. One can only regard making
universal laws as morally autonomous, under the idea of freedom. Prac
tical reason or the will of a rational being "miust regard itself as free;
that is, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except
41
under the idea of freedom," The idea of freedom is thus practically
41
Immanuel Kant, Fundam.ental Principles of the iVletaphysic of .Morals,
trans, Thomas K. Abbott (London: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952'),
p. 280.
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necessary, a necessary condition of morality. Freedom is not logically
contradictory because it must belong to the sphere of noumenal reality,
and the existence of such a sphere is not logically contradictory. Also
as theoretical knowledge does not extend into this sphere, freedom is
not susceptible of theoretical proof. But the assumption of freedom is
a practical necessity for the m.oral agent; and it is thus no mere arbi
trary fiction.
From this, therefore, the practical necessity of the idea of free
dom involves regarding oneself as belonging not only to the world of
sense, which is ruled by determined causality, but also to the intelli
gible or noumenal world. Thus, man can regard himself as belonging to
the sensible world in which he finds himself subject to natural lav/s
(heteronomy) , and as belonging to the intelligible world, in which he
42
finds himself under laws which have their foundation in reason alone.
And these categorical imperatives are possible because the
idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in
consequence of which, supposing that I were nothing else, all
my actions would always conform to the autonomy of the will;
but as I at the same time intuit myself as a member of the
world of sense, my actions ought so to conform. And this cat
egorical ought implies a synthetic a priori proposition.'*^
It can thus be summed up by quoting Kant in his own words:
The question, therefore, how a categorical imperative is pos
sible, can be answered to this extent, that one can assign the
only presupposition on which it is possible, namely the idea
of freedom; and one can also discern the necessity of this pre -
supposition, which is sufficient for the practical use of rea
son, that is, for the conviction of the validity of this im
perative, and hence of the moral law. But no human reason
42
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can ever discern how this presupposition that the will of an
intelligence is free, its autonomy, as the essential form.al
condition of its determination, is a necessary consequence.'*'*
That no human reason can discern the possibility of freedom, Kant was
referring to positive possibility. Man enjoys no intuitive insight into
the sphere of noumenal reality. Man cannot prove freedom, and hence
the possibility of a categorical imperative cannot be proved, but he can
indicate the condition under which only a categorical imperative is pos
sible. The idea of this condition is a practical necessity for the moral
agent. The impossibility of proving freedom indicates the limitations
of human theoretical knowledge.
The practical necessity of the idea of freedom leads naturally to
the Kantian theory of the postulates of the practical reason, which in
cludes freedom, immortality, and God. The ideas which Kant declared to
be the main themes of metaphysics, which he also judged to transcend the
limitations of reason in its theoretical use, are introduced as postu
lates of reason in its practical use.
In discussing freedom as a postulate of practical reason, it has al"
ready been seen that a theoretical proof of a rational being being free
is, according to Kant, impossible for the human reason. Yet it cannot be
shown that freedom is not possible. And the moral law compels an assump
tion of it and therefore authorizes the assumption. The m.oral law com
pels one to assume it inasmuch as the concept of freedom and the concept
of the supremacy of mortality "are so inseparately united that one might
define practical freedom as independence of the will on anything but
44
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the moral law alone." Because of this inseparable connection the
moral law is said to postulate freedom,.
As there is no faculty of intellectual intuition, actions which
belong to the noumenal cannot be observed; all the actions which can be
observed, either internally or externally, must be objects of the in
ternal or external senses. They are thus all subject to the laws of
causality. Therefore, a distinction cannot be made between experienced
actions which are free and those which are determined.
Kant is aware of this difficulty for he remarked that if freedom is
to be saved
... no other way remains than to ascribe the existence of a
tiling, so far as it is determinable in time, and therefore
also its causality according to the law of natural necessity,
to appearance alone, and to ascribe freedom to precisely the
same being as a thing in itself. '^^
Kant then asks, "How can a man be called completely free at the same m.o-
ment and in regard to the same action in which he is subject to an in-
47
evi table natural necessity?" He answered this question in terms of
time-conditions. Insofar as man's existence is subject to time-
conditions, his actions form part of the mechanical system of nature and
are determined by antecedent causes. "But the very same subject, being
on the other hand also conscious of himself as a thing in itself, consid
ers his existence also insofar as it is not subject to time-conditions,
and he regards himself as determinable only through laws which he gives
48
himself through reason." To be determinable only through self-imposea
49
laws is to be free.
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Because of Kant's dualism, he failed to render his concept of free
dom intelligible. He conceived of determinism as a purely mechanical
determinism, and he did not see that genuine self -determinism can take
place within a larger idealistically interpreted deterministic system,
and he could not appreciate the element of strength in such a determin-
50
istic theory- Therefore, instead of defining freedom along determin
istic lines, as the progressive achievement of moral value in the phe
nomenal world and in strict conformity with its law, he sought to pre
serve man's absolute autonomy be cutting him off from all influences,
divine, human and physical alike, and required him to act m.orally de
spite the larger whole. Hence, Kant was unable to explain how one and
the same man could be free and yet not free in one and the same act, and
that he finally had to confess that man's freedom is ultimately a myst
ery not to be fathomed by the human mind.^'^
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, p, LV.
51"
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Ideal Good
In order to have a clearer understanding of Kant's second postulate
of the practical reason (immortality) , it is necessary to look at his
conception of the summum bonum, literally meaning the highest or supreme
good ,
Reason seeks an unconditioned totality. It seeks the unconditioned
totality of the object of practical reason or the will, to which object
the name of summiom boniom is given. This term is ambiguous. "It may
mean the supreme or highest good in the sense of that which is not it
self conditioned. Or it may mean the perfect good in the sense of a
52
whole which is not itself a part of a greater whole," Virtue is the
supreme and unconditioned good, but it does not follow that it is the
perfect good in the sense that it is the total object of the desires
of a rational being. Happiness must also be included in the concept
of a perfect good. Summum bonum is therefore understood to include both
virtue and happiness.
The connection between virtue and happiness (elements of the perfect
good) is not logical. If the connection is logical or analytic, the
endeavor to be virtuous, to make one's will accord perfectly with the
moral law, would be the same as the rational pursuit of happiness. The
connection, therefore, between the two elements of the perfect good is
synthetic, in the sense that virtue produces happiness, as a cause pro
duces its effect.
Copelston, p, 128.
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Tlie summum bonum means the whole, the perfect good, in which,
however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good,
because it has no condition above it, whereas happiness, while
it is certainly pleasant to him who possess it, is not of it
self absolutely and in every respect good, but always pre
supposes morally right behaviour as its condition.
A man who is seeking his happiness cannot discover it by analysis
of his idea that he is virtuous, because the truth of the perfection
that virtue and happiness constitute the two elements of the perfect
good cannot be discovered by analysis. In the same v/ay, a virtuous man
cannot discover that he is happy by analyzing the idea of being virtuous
as the Stoics may have said. The two ideas are distinct. The proposi
tion is at the same time synthetic and a priori. The connection between
virtue and happiness is practically necessary because virtue ought to
produce happiness. But it cannot be said that the desire for happiness
must be the motive for pursuing virtue, because if would contradict the
whole idea of acting for the sake of duty and would substitute heter
onomy for autonomy of the will. Virtue must be recognized as the effi
cient cause of happiness. For the moral law commands promotion of the
summum bonum, in which virtue and happiness are related as conditions to
conditioned, as cause to effect.
But how can it possibly be held that virtue necessarily produces
happiness? Kant's solution to this question consisted in showing that
the assertion that virtue necessarily produces happiness is only condi
tionally false. It is false only on condition that existence in this
world be taken to be the only sort of existence that a rational being
53
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can have, and if the assertion is taken as meaning that virtue exercises
in this sensible world a causality productive of happiness. To say that
the search for happiness produces virtue would be absolutely false; but
that virtue produces happiness is only conditionally false, not abso
lutely. It can, therefore, be true if one is justified in thinking that
one exists not only as a physical object in this sensible world, but
also as a noumenon in an intelligible and supersensible world. The moral
law, being inseparably connected with the idea of freedom, demands that
one should believe this. The realization of the summum bonum is, there
fore possible, virtue (the supreme or highest good) , producing happi
ness, if not immediately, yet at least mediately (through the agency
of God) .
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Immortality as a Postulate of Practical Reason
The conception of existence in another world has been referred to
in the conception of the summum bonum. Kant actually approaches the
postulate of immortality through a consideration of the first element of
the perfect good, virtue.
The moral law commands one to promote the summum bonum, which is
the necessary object of the rational will. This means that one is com
manded by the practical reason to pursue virtue which causes happiness,
but not that the moral law commands pursuing it because it causes happi
ness. Man's inmiortality is a necessary postulate of practical reason
because it is required to guarantee one of the two ingredients of the
summum bonum (virtue and happiness) . Virtue is the perfect harmony of
man's mind with the moral law. Such harmony is obviously unattainable
by a finite being during his lifetime. Yet it is required because the
moral lav/ ordains that one ought to be perfectly virtuous. The virtue
which one is commanded to strive after is the complete accordance of
will and feeling with the moral law is holiness, and this is "a perfec
tion of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any
improvement of its existence. "54 If perfect virtue is commanded by rea
son in its practical use, and if at the same time it is not attainable
by a human being at any given moment, virtue must be realized in the
form of an indefinite, unending progress towards the ideal, "For a ra
tional but finite being, the only thing possible is an endless progress
from the lower to the higher degrees of moral perfection.
"^^ But infinite
Ibid., p.. 226. Ibid.
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progress is possible only if our existence is infinite, if our souls are
tion of the unending duration of the existence and personality of the
same rational being, which is called the immortality of the soul."^^
As the attainment of the first element of the summum bonum, the pursuit
of which is commanded by the moral law, is possible only on the supposi
tion that the soul is immortal, immortality of the soul is a postulate
of the pure practical reason =' It is not demonstrable by reason in its
theoretical use, which can show only that immortality is not logically
impossible, but as the idea of immortality is inseparably connected with
the moral law, immortality must be postulated.
In talking of the nature of this future state, Kant's general atti
tude was expressed in his own statement: "We can know nothing of the
future, and we ought not to seek to knov; more than what is rationally
57
bound up with the incentives of morality and their end." In general,
he conceived of the next life as a continuation of this.
At least man has no ground for believing that a sudden change
will take place. Rather, experience of his state on earth and
the ordering of nature in general gives him clear proofs that
his moral deterioration, with its inevitable punishments, as
well as his moral improvement and the well-being ^gesulting
therefrom, will continue endlessly.- i.e., eternally."
Kant attached no importance to t.he resurrection of the body. He said,
" For who is so fond of his body that he would wish to drag it about with
immortal. But this endless progress is possible only on the supposi-
him through all eternity if he could get on without it?"
59
Of spiritu-
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uality, reason can neither take an interest in dragging along, through
eternity, a body which, however purified, must yet (if personality is to
rest upon the body's identity) consist of the self-same stuff which con
stitutes the basis of its organization and for which, in life, it never
achieved any great love, nor can it render conceivable that this calcer-
eous earth, of which the body is composed, should be in heaven; that is,
in another region of the universe where presumably other materials m.ight
constitute the existence of maintenance of living beings.
A variety of objections have been brought against Kanfs doctrine
about the postulate of immortality.. He contradicts himself. On the one
hand, the attainment of virtue must be possible, for it is commanded by
practical reason. If therefore, it is not attainable in this life.
there must be another life in which it is attainable. On the other hand
it is never attainable, either in this life or in any other. There is
only an unending progress towards an unattainable ideal. It seems there
fore that the moral law commands the impossible.
It has also been objected that the attainment of holiness cannot be
regarded as a command of moral lav;. But whatever may be the cogencv of
these objections, Kant himself laid considerable stress on the idea of
the moral commanding holiness, as an ideal goal. In his opinion, denial
of this command involves a degradation of the moral law, a lowering of
standards to fit the weakness of human nature.
60
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Concluding Remarks on the Three Postulates
As Kant notes, the three postulates have this in common, that "they
all proceed from the principle of morality, which is not a postulate but
a law."
^
They also certainly extend knowledge, but "only from a prac
tical point of view."^^
Kant also stated that inasmuch as neither free, immortal souls, nor
God, are given as objects of intuition, "there is, therefore, no exten
sion of the knowledge of given supersensible objects. "^"^ This seems
to be a tautology, for if God and the soul are not given as objects,
they obviously cannot be known as given objects. But it is also stated
that though God and the free, immortal soul are not given as objects of
any intellectual intuition, the theoretical reason
'
s knowledge of the
supersensible is increased to this extent that it is compelled to admit
64
"that there are such objects."
Ibid., p. 234. Ibid., p. 235.
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Chapter 5
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY
The one important question which Kant poses is whether or not God
can be thought about or talked about. Kant has had an enormous impact
on present day thinking about God. His influence has been largely neg
ative in this regard.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, the central idea is that man's cat
egories, man's ways of thinking about the world, apply only within the
realm of experience� the phenomenal world or the world of mere appear
ance. This is the inner world of tables and chairs, plants and animals,
mountains and oceans, planets and stars, not the outer world of things
as they are in themselves. This world is of man's own making. The
world of everyday experience (the phenomenal world) is one men have con
structed out cf the raw material of sensation."^ The activity of the
noumenal, or things-in-themselves, produce smell, feeling, sights, and
sounds, sense data. The mind works on these data and forms them into
the objects of everyday experience. One thus establishes the role of
the rational and conceptual in the experience of an objective world.
Since one creates the world in which one lives, then the objects of ev
eryday experience depend on man for their existence. If there had been
no human beings the objects v.'ould not have been in existence.
^
Alvin Platinga, "A Contemporary Response," in Jack B. Rogers and
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According to Kant, concepts are something like rules which the mind
uses to unify the manifold. They are rules according to which sense
data are comlsined and unified. This means then that concepts do not
apply to what lies beyond experience, to the world of noumena or things-
in-themselves. If concepts do not apply to them, then they cannot be
thought about, because thinking about something is a matter of applying
concepts to that thing. If a thing cannot be thought about, it inevita
bly follows that beliefs about that thing cannot be held. If concepts
do not apply to things-in-themselves, there cannot be a belief that
there is just one thing-in-itself; for that would be applying the con
cept of uniqueness to the realm of things-in-themselves. One cannot
also believe that there is more than one thing-in-itself for that is
to suppose that the concept of more than one applies to the realm of
things-in-themselves .
If there are any noumena or things-in-themselves then, clearly
enough, God is among them. God is ultimately real. If this distinction
between the noumena and the phenomena is a real distinction, then con
cepts cannot apply to God who is in the noumena, which in turn means that
God cannot be so much as thought of or talked about. Beliefs about God
cannot be formed because that would apply a concept to God.
The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and
the consequent recognition that all conceptual knowledge is abstract,
and all existential knowledge is synthetic, raised for Kant the problem
of the relation of one to the other, the problem of the empirical applic-
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ability to logic. Kant's distinction remained firmly entrenched; gen
eral acceptance of the analytic nature of mathematics has removed the
last seemingly intermediate type of concepts and the abstract. If logic
has nothing to do with the actual world, the actual world has nothing to
do with logic. The converse of logical formalism is existentialism."^
Another philosophical issue is that the conceptual element which
Kant eliminated from existence, he found in experience; and science and
the physical object became conceptualized as abstracts, and only the
bare data of sense remained concrete and existential. Kant produced the
problem of locating existence in a world of abstractions, independent
reality in a world defined and limited by the nature of human cognitive
equipment. Here it can be seen in existentialism the reaction against the
conceptualized, abstract world which science and the positivist philos
ophy of science present.
In Kant's view, the concept of phenomenon demanded as its correla
tive the concept of thing-in-itself. The phenomenon does not make sense
without the noum.enon, yet he maintained that one must refrain from as
serting dogmatically the existence of thing-in-itself though thinking it
cannot be helped. Kant thought it absurd to reduce the reality to a
mere construction of the subject, and he therefore looked on the reten
tion of the conception of the thing-in-itself as a matter of common sense
This theory of the thing-in-itself has been objected to as superfluity
^
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and a monstrosity by Fichtes. In Fichtes* view, the thing-in-itself
had to be eliminated in the interests of idealism. Kant was a man who
tried to have things both ways at once, and who involved himself in hope
less inconsistencies. If one accepts the Kantian theory of the sub
ject's part in the construction of experience, one is bound to go for
ward to a fully idealist philosophy -
In Kant's account of morality as in the Critique of Practical Rea
son, the type of reasoning employed is practical with moral action as
5
its goal. It is subject to the categorical im.perative of duty. It
is this imperative to do one's duty that necessarily implies the freedom
to be able to do one ' s duty -
Kant drew a clear and impassable line between pure (speculative)
and practical (mioral) reason. He did this because it enabled him to
isolate and delimit the nature and limitations of speculative reason,
and to establish moral philosophy and action on an independent and au-
tonomous basis. Here is the cornerstone of nearly all of contemporary
philosophy and theology. "The theoretical use of reason was concerned
with objects of the cognitive faculty only. ... It is quite different
with the practical use of reason. In this, reason is concerned with
the grounds of determination of the will. ..."
Kant's account of religion fits smoothly into this epistemological
and moral dichotomy. Religion had traditionally found its basis in the
Copelston, p. 221.
^
Gill, p. 80.
^
Ibid., p. 81.
7 . .
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realm of knowledge and more particularly in the field of metaphysics.
The claims of religion were construed as knowledge claims about ultimate
(noumenal) reality. By delineating the phenomenal limits of knowledge
claims, Kant rendered this view of religion entirely sterile,^ The end
of metaphysics meant the end of religious speculation. Religion was
moved out of the range of intellectual criticism. Thus, according to
Kant, religion's main concerns are obeying God and serving mankind, and
these have to do with morality, and not knowledge. In Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant distinguished between a reasoned and a
revealed religion. Reasoned religion is based on practical reason and
is primarily concerned with morality- Revealed religion is based on
historical facts and is primarily concerned with doctrines and practices.
Only reasoned religion can be universal since it is based on the moral
imperative which every man experiences; whereas, revealed religion is
limited to a few, for it is based on special information. One of the
main concerns of Kant's religion can be seen in the following quotation
in which he maintained that when men
fulfil their duties to men (themselves and others) they are,
by these very acts, performing God's commands and are there
fore in all their actions and abstentions, sc far as these
concern morality, perpetually in the service of God, and that
it is absolutely impossible to serve God more directly in any
other way (since they can affect and h^ve an influence upon
earthly beings alone, and not upon God) ,
The connection between Kant's position and contemporary theology can be
seen at this point. Kant provided an unequivocal foundation for the
8
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thought of l-xDth Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultrnann .
" �
Both of the dominant
theological movements of today reject any attempts to base religion and
theology upon speculative reason. When Kant rejected revelation as the
basis of religion, he parted company with the main thrust of Earth's
thought. When he placed religion in the moral realm, he continued to
perform as a forerunner, along with Kierkegaard, of Bultmann's position.
Karl Barth 's thinking was dominated by Kantian perspectives con
cerning the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds.
He started making use of this distinction by the terms "general history"
(Historie) and "special history" (Geschichte) . Historie is ordinary
history v/hich everyone experiences, and it is that which historians rec
ognize and describe; that is, historical facts which can be objectively
verified. Geschichte involves the act of God, the events of revelation
which touch one existentially but are not open to the historian. Accord
ing to the early Barth then, there is nothing in history on which faith
could base itself. Revelation does not enter history; it only touches
history, thereby making the dichotomy between faith and history. .Stand
ing on the strong foundation of Kant's noumenal and phenomenal dichotomy
Barth talks of the infinite qualitative difference between God and man.'''"''
In his dialectical method, his emphasis on God as the Wholly Other makes
God, strictly speaking, indescribable. God is not -an object of time
and space, hence He is unknown.
Gill, p. 82.
"''"'�
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Rudolf Bultmann was also affected by Kant's epistemological dualism.
He emphasized that the existentialistic kerygma had little or no ground
ing in history. He attempted to set forth a self-conscious existential
ist theology which seeks to establish a kerygma independent of history.
According to Bultmann, the mythical world view of the Biblical writers
involves a three-dimensional view of the universe. There is the world
up there, and another world down there, and we live down here in between
the two. He called for a demythologization of the New Testament and
left the kerygma. What remained after demythologization is an existen
tialistic perspective of a self-conscious, modern, pecular world, which
is the heart of his kerygma. The radical dichotomy between history and
faith takes existentialistic form in Bultmann's theology. He places his
theology in the noumenal realm, purely value, not fact. He eventually
opted for the Christ of faith at the expense of the Jesus of history,
which is dangerous to the Christian faith. He bifurcates between fact
and value, history and revelation. These are Kantian categories as far
as his theology is concerned.
The connection between Kant's position and the dominant movements
of contem.porary philosophy can be seen also. Both empiricism and exis
tentialism reject classical m.etaphysical philosophy as impossible. Ex
istentialism is in agreement with the positive development of Kant's
thought to the degree that it separates the valuational realm from the
factual. Thus Kant emerges as the intellectual progenitor of the con-
12
temporary dichotomized situation in both theology and philosophy.
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Having separated knowledge and morality, and having identified re
ligion with morality, Kant showed himself to conjecture about the impli
cations of his view of religion. Kant m.aintained that the moral impera
tive of duty implied personal immortality and the existence of God.
Since man is faced with the imperative of doing his duty to become a
virtuous person, it is only reasonable to postulate the continuation of
life after death and the existence of an eternal, all-good God. Immort
ality is necessary to all sufficient time to achieve the desired virtue,
and God to serve as the ground and standard of the desired virtue. Sev
eral contemporary philosophers have testified to the fact that Kant is
proposing a dichotomy in his epistemology.
After tracing Kant's arguments against applying the categories of
the understanding to the noumenal world, and discussing the concepts of
the soul, the cosmos, and God, P. F. Strawson concluded with the follow
ing remarks :
The case against a theology based on the theoretical employ
ment of reason is concluded. Neither by a priori nor by empir
ical arguments can the existence of a divine being be estab
lished. 'The only theology of reason which is possible is
that which is based upon moral laws or seeks guidance from
them. ' Nevertheless a thorough understanding of the necessary
incompetence of theoretical reason in this sphere is not with
out a twofold negative utility to theology itself. If we are
inhibited from, asserting, we are also inhibited from denying,
on theoretical grounds. What we may have other, perhaps moral
grounds for accepting, and we are restrained from im.porting
empirical impurities into any conception of an ideal being in
which a moral theology may give us grounds for belief.^'*
George F. Thomas found the source of major difficulties in Kant's
13 . ,
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philosophy in the rigid dualisms between phenomena and noumena, sensa
tion and understanding, theoretical and practical reason. He pinpoints
the difficulties connected with Kant's denial of the possibility of
knowledge of God in temis of Kant's dichotomy between pure and practical
reason. Kant was inhibited from constructing a religious epistemology
by his disenchantment with the systematic theology of his day. Thomas
gives his evaluation:
Kant was also inhibited by his dualism between theoretical and
practical reason. The distinction between the theoretical
and the practical functions of reason is a real one, and it is
as old as Aristotle. But Kant misconceives these functions
when he limits the theoretical reason to cognition of objects
and the practical reason of legislation for action. The ef
fect of this sharp division of functions is a dualism of what
is and what ought to be, existence and value. Once this dual
ism has arisen, it is difficult to overcome it.'''^
John E. Smith sees Kant as the source of the contemporary stalemate
He argues that Kant's dualism has led both to severe epistemological
difficulties and to undermining the possibility of constructing an ade
quate and comprehensive theory of the knowledge of God. He writes:
If we survey the development of religious thought since Kant,
we cannot escape one fact: Most thinkers who have taken Kant
as a point of departure have accepted without question the
validity of the analysis through which he arrived at his con
clusions regarding the limitation of reason. We need to ask
whether there is any rational way out of the impasse in the
present philosophical and religious situation. On one side
stands the domain of 'factual' knowledge represented by science
and positivistic philosophies and on the other stands 'value'
represented by existential philosophies and theology. The ex
istence of this split in the modern intellectual situation
points back to the ultimate dualism in Kant's own thought.^
Ibid., p. 85. Ibid., p. 86.
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The rigidity, frustration, and pessimism of Kant's epistemological
dualism are forcefully expressed in Kant's writing. In speaking of the
cognitive domain, he said:
This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within un
alterable limits. It is the land of truth�enchanting nam.e�
surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of il
lusion, where many a fog bank and many swiftly melting ice
bergs give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, delud
ing the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and
engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet
is unable to carry to completion. �'"^
Kant's epistemological dualism based on the dichotomy between fact
and value has led to an exceedingly frustrating stalemate between empir
icism and existentialism. The dialogue between empiricism and existen
tialism is rendered impossible, and it creates profound discontent for
anyone who is drawn to both points of viev;.
The dualism has also led to the separation of the talk about what
is, from talk about what ought to be. They are not, and cannot be sepa
rated. When a theory of knowledge is out of harmony with the practice
of knowledge, then the theory stands in need of overhaul or replacement.
This is the task of the next chapter.
Critique of Pure Reason , p , 257.
Chapter 6
AN ALTERNATIVE TO KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY
The effect of the epistemological dichotomies of Kant has been dis
astrous upon the problem of the knowledge of God. The temptation for
Christians since the Enlightenment era has been to spell out their ex
perience in the language of the Enlightenment. This has always ended in
failure because many things about the belief in God cannot be said in
the v;ords or language dear to the Enlightenment,
Having pointed out the existence of an epistemological dichotomy,
which has led to a contemporary stalemate, the problem which is left to
be dealt with is that of overcoming it by supplying a more adequate
theory of knov/ledge. In attempting to overcome Kant's dichotomies of
epistem.ology, it must be borne in mind that they should be replaced and
not corrected. To correct the dichotomy is to leave the element of the
dichotomy, and it is to continue on the same course, to build on a weak
foundation. To replace it means to start afresh and have the roots com
pletely removed, and to build on a solid foundation. The problem then
is where to begin to look for an epistemological foundation which will
provide for the possibility cf religious knowledge. According to Jerry
Gill, the point of departure is "linguistic analyses"''" which is to say
that the best way to obtain an understanding of the major features of
reality and experience is to pay close attention to the function and
^
Gill, p. 91.
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structure of language. Reality and experience are closely related be
cause "the structure of reality is mediated through experience, a.nd that
experience itself is mediated through language."^
"What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot
talk about we must consign to silence."^ This statement reflects the
thought of the early Wittgenstein's philosophy in support of the dichot
omy- The theme of his later thought is that language is multi-functional,
many-splendored phenomenon v;hich cannot be limited to the confines of
logic and science. Instead of limiting the uses of language to cogni
tive and non-cognitive uses, it must be seen that there are countless
uses of language.
In discussing the main themes in Wittgenstein's later philosophy,
Jerry Gill points out that they provide the wherewithal for undermining
the fact-value dichotom.y. They provide a major clue to constructing an
interpretation of experience and knowledge which is far superior to that
underlying the contemporary epistemological stalemate. It might well
suffice to mention one of the themes, which is that language must be
understood as a human tool or instrument- Statements are mea.ningi'jl
only because they are made by persons seeking to fulfill certain pur
poses. "One cannot guess how a word functions- One has to look at its
4
use and learn from that." Meaning must thus be seen as function of use
and not of representation- Wittgenstein also concludes that language,
far from being a distinct and autonomous entity standing between persons
and reality, is actually the medium in which both personhood and reality
^
Ibid., p. 92.
^
Ibid., p. 90
^
Ibid., p. 100.
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can be said to exist, it must be viewed as an "extension of both self
hood and reality^ "^ in which no demarcation will be drawn between one's
self, one's form of life, and one's various uses of language. This goes
along with the common expression, "A man is his word."^ Language and
reality are then indistinguishable because reality is mediated by means
of language. This overcom.es Kant's dualism which falls back on a repre
sentational dualism in thought and language, whereas this view proposes
that the relationships between the self, thought, language, and reality
must be conceived of as continuous and holistic in nature.' Language is
thus viewed as a means by which the speaker projects himself into re
ality. Thought and reality will thus be blended together in a func
tional manner instead of being dichotomized.
This new understanding of the relationship between language and
action, or thought and reality.- has great implications for a fresh start
in epistemology, and even in overcoming Kant's epistemological dualism.
This new understanding views language "as a flexible, open-ended phenom
enon with no hard and fast lines drawn between it and the speaker on
8
the one hand, and between it and the surrounding world on the other."
It also disposes of the necessity of confining meaning to a
narrov/ly presented class of statements. It is possible to avoid the
dualistic stalemate inherent in these interpretations, be they existen
tialists or empiricists, that are based on a dichotomized view of human
^
Ibid., p. 106.
^
Ibid., p. 107.
7 8
Ibid. Ibid., p. 113.
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existence, with a broader and enriched understanding of language and
9
meaning.
Another helpful insight or clue to the development of one episte
mological foundation which is not based on this dualism is that "all
uses of language are multi-dimensional in nature . "''"*^ This is to say
that statements are made up of both cognitive and non-cognitive forces
simultaneously. This view cuts through the impasse confronting contem.p-
orary philosophical and theological thought, and it points to the possi
bility of viewing experience as also multi -dimensional , It must, how
ever.- be noted that for a statement to be real or true, it must be made
by someone, her.ce, "Truth is a function of personal commitment .
"^^ This
is a direct challenge to the empiricist bias against the possibility of
metaphorical language's being cognitively true. This is because it is
impossible to restrict the concept of cognitive truth to the domain of
factual assertions. If the assertions of empiricism no longer have a
monopoly on the cognitive function of language, then it is hard to main
tain that knowledge be limited to the logical and empirical dimensions
of experience. Thus, an epistemology which encompasses both existen
tialism, and empiricism must be formulated.
According to Jerry Gill, a sound view of language necessitates in
terpreting knowledge as a function of contextual, dim.ensional , and
tacit
awareness, and also as a function of purposeful, committed, and creative
response.
"""^
To grasp the meaning cf language dei^ends on one being
^
Ibid. Ibid.
Ibid., p. 115. Ibid., p. 117.
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tacitly aware cf the dimensions which make up the context of any given
statement. Knowledge is thus bound up with experiential awareness.
To grasp the truth of language depends upon responding as a total person
to experience, thus making knowledge to be bound up with integrated
activity.
The traditional perspective which has been used in the interpreta
tion of reality and human experience has been that of a model of differ
ent realms or worlds. This realm-model is very much reflected in the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, as it can be clearly seen in his phenomenal
and noumenal realms or the dichotom.ies between rational and moral realms.
This realm-model has produced a great dilemma in religious knowledge with
its talk about the spiritual realm as different or distinct from the
natural realm, or the isolation of God in the spiritual realm from human
beings in the natural realm. This creates the problem of the unknow-
ability cf God in the spiritual realm. The further dilemma is that in
the long run, people will deny the existence of any unique, spiritual
realm. The way out of the dilemma is the replacement of realm-model
with dim.ension-model . Realm-model bifurcates, dimension-model distin
guishes, but does not bifurcate. Dimension -model emphasized
the simul
taneity of human existence.
""'^
Thus reality and experience simultan
eously interpenetrate and are not divided into separate
realms. Dimen
sion-model thus helps to overcome the dualism of epistemology-
Fact
and value will no longer be thought of as separate realms.
Dimension-model calls for a continuum instead of bifurcation
or
Ibid. , p. 119.
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A
Religious
dichotomy. This can be seen in the fact that man is comprised of four
main simultaneously interpenetrating dimensions, namely: the physical,
the moral, the personal, and the religious.
"""^
These four dimensions are
not separate entities but are all related to one another by the idea of
mediation; however, it must be noted that this progression from the phys
ical to the religious is hierarchical in nature. Though hierarchical,
the idea or concept of mediation does not reduce the higher to the lower.
Thus the concept of mediation can overcome the dichotomy since fact and
value simultaneously interpenetrate each other. This diagram illus
trates the hierarchical concept of mediation:
The physical dimension is the aspect of
experience in which one is aware of the material
world. The perceiver is in active relationship
with the perceived. There is a dynamic contin
uum between them rather than as static entities. The moral dimension
with the aspect of experience which deals with one's awareness of
other persons. One becomes aware of his physical dimension of existence
by his relationship with others. There is also a dynamic continuum be
tween people. They do not live as separate entities. Personal dimen
sion deals v.'ith one's awareness of him.self as a person. Self -awareness
is mediated by the p.hysical and moral dimensions. The necessity of the phys-
Personal
Moral
Physical
ical dimension for self -awareness should be self-explanatory.
15
Thi:
14
Paul Hick, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1966) , p. 110.
15
Gill, p. 122,
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self-knowledge is mediated through the kno'wing of the subject's own body,
in which case there is no dualism between mind and body. This dichot
omy which is reflected in Kant's epistemological dualism can be overcome
by seeing man in a m.ore holistic way that implies a dimensional and med-
iational epistemology .''"^ Being aware of oneself as a result of the re
lationship with others leads one to the religious dimension of the tacit
level , that there must be a relationship between the person and the
Being (God) in the religious dimension. It is mediated through the
physical, moral, and personal dimensions .
Michael Polanyi has been the thinker who has made the most lasting
contribution to the constrxaction of a post-critical epistemology. Dr.
Harold B. Kuhn, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy o'f Religion at Asbury
Theological Seminary, presents Polanyi as a pioneer''"^ in epistemology
over against the dominant epistemological dualism which is founded in
the philosophical system of Immanuel Kant. He asserted that the Kantian
view of knowledge and reality leading to the distinction between pure
reason and practical reason is now seen by many thinkers as ''destructive,
not only of rational thought in general but also of all valid religious
, , ..18
knowledge.
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976), a physicist and chemist after World
16 TV,-^Ibid.
�""^
Harold B. Kuhn, "Michael Polanyi, Modern Pioneer in Epistemology"
in A Celebration of Ministry, ed. Kenneth C. Kinghorn (Wilmore: Francis
Asbury Publishing Company, Inc., 1982), p. 23.
Ibid.
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War II, turned to epistemology undertaking what can be called "a dis
covery of discovery. "^^ Polanyi's emphasis on heuristic epistemology,
which is a knowledge theory based on discovery, led him to recognize be
lief as the source of all knowledge� "all knowledge, including scien
tific knowledge, is personal knowledge . "'^^ Thus he asserted the unity
of all -knowledge which means that theological truth must be part of it.
Dr. Kuhn thus concludes that Polanyi's "post-critical epistemology
opens the door to a deliverance from the Kantian model and a rediscovery
2 1of the essential unity between knowledge and Christian faith."
In talking of the dimension-model and awareness, Polanyi has made
some helpful distinctions (not dichotomies) which provide the guidelines
for any attempt to overcome the epistemological dualism under consider-
22
ation. He talked of focal and subsidiary awareness. By focal aware
ness, Polanyi meant that in any given cognitive context one is aware of
some factors before he directs his attention to them. In the case of
subsidiary awareness there are factors of which the knower is aware
though he m.ay not focus on them. The point here is that cognitive aware
ness is a function of a continuum between focal and subsidiary awareness.
The second distinction pointed out by Polanyi is that of activity
continuum which has the two poles of conceptualization and embodiment or
the verbal and non-\/erbal respectively. Human behavior is a mixture of
both verbal and body activity -
19 20 21
Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 30. Ibid., p. 32.
22
.Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge {Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1958), p. x.
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These two distinctions lead to the third which is knowledge con
tinuum, which has the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge.
When the poles of focal awareness and conceptual acticity are related,
the result is explicit knowledge. When the poles of subsidiary aware
ness and bodily activity are related, the result is tacit knowledge.
Illustrations :
1. Awareness Continuum: Focal Subsidiary
Activity Continuum: Conceptual Bodily
Knowledge Continuum: Explicit Tacit
2. Awareness Continuum + Activity Continuum = Knowledge Continuum
Focal + Conceptual = Explicit
Subsidiary + Bodily = Tacit
Failure to think of knowledge as a continuum results in the dichotomy
between cognitive and non-cognitive judgments. Polanyi emphasized that
tacit knowledge cannot be known explicitly, but there is a continuum be
tween the tacit and explicit poles of knowledge. Thus all knowledge in
volves a blending of explicit and tacit cognition.
The significance of this discussion is that, with epistemological
dichotomy as its foundation, modern thought has been led into a schizo
phrenic stalem.ate of choosing betv/een fact and value as separate enti
ties, but with epistemological continaumi the way has been opened to ap
preciate both fact and value as cognitive acts. Continuum, approach
helps one to see the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge
instead of rejecting either fact (as the case of existentialism) or
value (as with empiricism) from the arena of significance. The con-
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tinuum approach helps to overcome the dichotomy between appearance and
reality as proposed by Immanuel Kant.
This new epistemological model opens the way for conceiving of re
ligious experience as being mediated through moral and personal exper
iences to produce a form of tacit knowledge.
Michael Polanyi does not see knowledge as awareness alone but as
response. Tacit knowing clearly involves the response of the knower.
The one who is aware also responds, thus there is "a personal co-effi-
23
cient" m all knowing. The three main aspects of this are firstly,
that knowledge is personal in nature because it is somebody's knowledge;
secondly that knowledge is possible with the personal involvement of the
knower. One has to become involved with something to know it well.
With personal involvement in knowledge the distinction between the know
er and the known disappears. Thirdly, every effort to obtain knowledge
and every claim to have found it are based in the personal commitments
of the person involved. Some commitments must be made before any cogni
tive investigation can get off the ground, therefore making knowledge
personal .
There are other areas which can be used to overcome Kant's dichot
omy between the phenomena and the noumena. Kant failed to see that
though one cannot know anything about God, one can speak about Him using
the analogy of language. Analogy is the method of predication whereby
a concept derived from an object that is relatively known is applied to
one that is relatively unknown. When analogy is used in discourse about
Gill, p. 140.
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God, it presupposes that though God is largely inaccessible. He is not
24
wholly unknowable.
Knowledge of God is neither univocal, that is applied to human be
ings, nor equivocal, that it is completely different from God, but ana
logical. The analogical method enables meaningful talk of God. This
method is attracive to the religious mind in that it is reflected in
the experience of religious people. Analogical language is a functional
and an experiential language. Though some things cannot be exactly pin
pointed about God, yet it is felt that there is an awareness of a Being
who is far beyond persons and beyond all else known. There are no enti
ties with which that Being can be compared, nevertheless it has been
found that he acts in the ways that have analogies. According to Geddes
25
MacGregor, there is som.e connaturality between God and men being the
creatures of God, hence man can speak about God. Analogical language is
an empiricological language which means that it does not stop with reaso
alone but encompasses both reason and experience. Analogical language
cannot be explained; it is implicit, but thought is beyond one's con-
ceptualxzatioa that it can be understood. In analogical language the
reality is literal, but the language itself is concrete. The language
is not literal because it will mean that abstractions are spoken of.
The reality is true but it cannot be fully comprehended. It is the lack
of accepting analogical language which has led to this dualism in epis
tem.ology .
Geddes MacGregor, Philosophical Issues in Religious Thought
(Washington, D., C. : University Press of America, 1979), p. 454.
Ibid., p. 51.
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Another helpful insight in overcoming Kant's epistemological dual
ism is the use of a high degree of probability in the search for knowl
edge. Intmanuel Kant was looking for absolute certainty in his search
for knowledge. He said that poor probabilities cannot be accepted be
cause "the entire transcendental philosophy, which necessarily precedes
all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete solution of the problem
here propounded, in systematic order and completeness, and hence we have
hitherto never had any transcendental philosophy- To have the type
of knowledge which Kant is proposing, one is to become transcendent,
hence to know God, one must become God himself.
But instead of the certainty which Kant was looking for, some knowl
edge of God can be had by the use of high degrees of probability. Hence
our definition of proof over against that of Kant should be guided by
probability. Probability simple means "the likelihood of something's
27
occurring; the qualxty or state of being likely to happen or true." It
is to be distinguished from certainty, Kan is a finite and nonself-
existent being, so he cannot explain everything because it takes a self-
existent and i.nfinite being to know and explain everything. One must
bear in mind that there can be no absolute precession but probability.
What is known must be accompanied by some accuracy. The conclusion is
never absolutely certain though it is based on evidence. It is only
probable because there is the possibility of discovering nev; evidence.
26
Prolegomena , p . 26 .
27
Stanley M. Honer and Thomas C. Hunt, Invitation to Philosophy:
Issues and Options (Belmont: Wadsv/orth Publishing Company, Inc.. 1978),
pp. 247-8.
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The conclusion is true as long as the premises are factual. The greater
the weight of the evidence the stronger the argument. Probability has
all degrees between bounds of impossibility and certainty. Probability
is relation between propositions. The relation is objective and logi-
28
cal. If knowledge is defined in terms of certainty and demonstrabil-
ity. it follows that there is no probable knowledge, but probable belief.
"It follows that knowledge as to probabilities cannot help us to knowl
edge of the certainly true,- while, to be probable in any degree, a be-
29
lief must have some foundation in knowledge."
The dichotomy between the noum.enal and the phenomenal worlds set by
the Enlightenment and Kant had forced many modern theologians to deny
that the historian could deal with the resurrection legitimately. Start
ing from the age of the Enlightenment, the positivistic view of history
and historiography had dominated theological activity. The distinction
between Historie cind Geschichte in Neo-orthodoxy continued to rest upon
a positivistic view of history. Wolfhart Pannenberg is one of the first
major theologians to challenge this positivistic view. He rejected the
evasion of historical facts introduced by the Historie-Geschichte dichot
omy-^'^ He saw that historical reality is to be open to the activity of
God, and that all history is an indirect revelation of God. This ac
knowledgement involves a significant break with the positivistic, natur-
F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: The University
Press, 1928) , p. 278.
Ibid. , p. 279.
^�
Fred H. Klooster, Quests for the Historical Jesus (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1977) , p. 80,
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alistic view of history, Kantian noumenal and phenomenal dichotomy, and
the Historie-Geschichte distinction of contemporary theology.
Pannenberg further insisted that facts and meaning (value) are not to
be bifurcated. Facts always have a context of meaning. The context
of an event determining or giving its meaning is basic to Pannenberg 's
historical approach. He returned to the basic question of history and
faith, and he was interested in grounding faith in history. Pannenberg
saw that the divorce between history and kerygm.a, as proposed by Barth
and Bultmann, was not helpful and that a kerygma without history "is a
meaningless noise. . . . Faith cannot live from kerygma detached from
its historical basis and content. "^�'' He maintained that the absolute
unity of knowledge and faith would come at the end of history. He also
attacked Bultmann's dissolving of history into individual existence by
saying that it was an attempt to flee into some suprahistorical harbor,
32
supposedly safe from the critical historical flood tide.
One thing to bear in mind is that religious knowledge has dualism
which stresses a real distinction betv/een perception or the perceiver
and what is to be perceived. Kant's epistemological dualism has had
negative effect because it stressed a divorce instead of a real dis
tinction.
Conn, p. 68.
32
^Conn, p. 67.
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GLOSSARY
In light of the various definitions of terms in this modern age, it
will be helpful to give a working definition of some of the terms which
are repeated often in this thesis.
Epistemology simply means the theory of knowledge. It will also be
used here as the philosophical investigation of the origins and struc
ture of knowledge and of the validity cf truth-claims.
Dualism is the view that reality is composed of two different sub
stances, neither of which can be reduced to the other. Mind and body
are designated as tnf- opposing reali-:ies.
Dichotc.'py is the division of any class into two contradictory and
mutually exclusive subclasses. It is any fundamental division, usually
irr.plying that tl^i. S3p.arAtion represents a permanent asspect of the nat
ure of things.
A priori designates ail principles and judgments whose validity is
not dependent in any way on sense impressions.
A posteriori is the data of the mind that originate in the external
world and are accepted as coming through the senses.
Rationalism means knowledge and truth are ultimately to be tested
by intellectual and deductive rather than sensory methods.
Empiricism means knowledge has its source and derives all its con
tent from experience.
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